REVIEW OF THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION’S RETREATS AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENTS

28TH MAY -12TH JULY 2019
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FOREWORD

It is the tradition of the Commission to undertake a comprehensive review of its performance in the aftermath of General election. This is with the objective of identifying its successes and failures and to learn vital lessons for improving the quality of elections and the electoral process. The review often consists of internal debriefing sessions and external engagement with electoral stakeholders to evaluate the Commission’s actions, processes and procedures before, during and after the election. The internal review process involves meetings with Electoral Officers, Administrative Secretaries, Directing Staff and Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) to critically appraise INECs own performance in the conduct of the election. Engagement with external stakeholders provides leaders of political parties, as well as members of the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the Media the opportunity to assess the conduct of the election and provide a feedback to the Commission.

Over a period of about five weeks (28th May - 12th July 2019), the Commission undertook a comprehensive review of the 2019 General Election in order to assess all activities, processes and procedures relating to the election. Consisting of a total of 12 engagements in six separate internal and external meetings, the review exercise was conducted in both plenary and breakout sessions in an open and transparent manner. This approach enabled the Commission to listen to its officials and all stakeholders and to learn vital lessons in the continuing effort to improve the conduct of future elections.

The review exercise was unique for two reasons. First was the bottom-up internal debriefing procedure which commenced with the Commission’s meeting with RECs to identify and promote a common understanding of the issues and the subsequent conduct of focused review meetings in the 36 States and FCT. Second was the expansion of the external engagement beyond the traditional stakeholders to include experience-sharing with selected Line Editors of media organisations and selected Collation and Returning Officers.

This Report, presented in 16 Chapters, identifies the main issues discussed in the review exercise and provide details of the observations, opportunities and challenges associated with each of the issues as well as concrete recommendations for resolving them. Already, the Commission has commenced the implementation of aspects of the 180 recommendations in the Report that only require administrative action. Where a review of the existing legal framework is required, the Commission has made a detailed submission to the National Assembly for its consideration.

The ability of the Commission to successfully undertake such a detailed and extensive
review of the 2019 General Election was due in part to several actors. The Commission appreciates the hard work of all its officials, especially the Directing Staff and constructive criticism of all external stakeholders that served to provide the required raw materials for the compilation of this report. Lastly, the Commission is grateful for the support received from the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for facilitating the review exercise in the continuing effort to improve our electoral process and the consolidation of our democracy.

Although this is not the first time that a post-election review is undertaken by the Commission, it is the first time that the outcome is published and shared extensively with the public. It is my fervent hope that this Report will promote a better understanding of the issues and challenges involved in the conduct of the 2019 General Election and, most importantly, elicit a broader national discourse and consensus on the necessary reforms required for the continued delivery of free, fair, credible and peaceful elections in Nigeria.

Professor Mahmood Yakubu
Chairman
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is Nigeria’s main Election Management Body (EMB). INEC’s core mandate as contained under Section 15, Part 1 of the Third Schedule of the Nigeria Constitution, 1999, (as amended) is to organize, undertake and supervise free, fair and credible elections into various political offices for the sustainability of democracy in Nigeria.

Following the conclusion of the 2019 General Election, and in keeping with its commitment to openess and transparency, INEC undertook a comprehensive national review of its performance at the elections. The review exercise, which is the subject matter of this report, involved first extensive discussions and presentations by INEC officials on the framework, scope, timetable and logistics that the Commission needed to put in place to facilitate an orderly and productive internal as well as external review of the 2019 General Election. The aim was to comprehensively evaluate the conduct of the elections, a SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis of the entire process and to learn vital lessons that would allow the Commission the opportunity to review its policies and programmes as a roadmap for future elections. This publication is the outcome of the review of the 2019 General Election.

In a very systematic and quick succession of activities, the Commission undertook review meetings/exercises in all the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), involving the 37 Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) and all the Electoral Officers (EOs) from the 774 Local Government Areas, for a grassroots, in-depth discussion on all aspects of the election, ranging from the general state of preparedness to execution and outcomes of the elections.

Other participants in the post-election review processes included external stakeholders, notably the political party executives, security agencies, civil society organisations, representatives of media organisations, Persons Living With Disabilities (PWDs), the Returning Officers and selected Presiding and Collation Officers involved in the elections.

First, we give thanks to God who made the election itself as well as its review possible, leading to the conclusion and production of this report. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all those who participated in the review meetings. Without their participation in the review exercise, this report will not have been possible. Specifically, we would like to mention all the members of the INEC Planning, Monitoring and Strategy Committee (PMSC): Honourable National Commissioners Amina Zakari, AVM Ahmed Mu’azu (rtd), Prof. Okechukwu Ibeanu, Prof. Antonia Simbine and Dr. Adekunle Ogunmola.
This report is a collective effort of all INEC staff, particularly the Departments and Directors that participated in the planning and organisation of the review meetings. Specific appreciation goes to Jude Okwuonu Ag. Director, Planning and Monitoring Directorate; Mrs Maryam Musa, Director, Commission Secretariat; Abdulrazak T. Yusuf, Director Electoral Operations and Logistics; Aminu Idris, Director, Election and Party Monitoring Department; Oluwole Osaze Uzzi, Director, Voter Education and Publicity Department; Richard Awolola, Director, Security Directorate; Okop Umobong, Director, International Corporation and Protocol; Prof. Mohammad J. Kuna, Special Adviser to the Chairman; Prof. Bolade Eyinla, Chief Technical Adviser to the Chairman and Rotimi Oyekanmi, the Chief Press Secretary to the Chairman.

Our very special thanks go to the European Center for Electoral Support (ECES) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) for funding and technical support throughout the various of retreats and stakeholder engagements.

Finally, on behalf of the Planning Monitoring and Strategy Committee (PMSD) of the Commission, I would like to specially thank the Hon. Chairman of INEC, Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, for his leadership and support for this review exercise and for his overall stewardship since the inception of the present Commission.

**Hon. Dr. Muhammed Mustafa Lecky**  
National Commissioner  
Chairman, Planning, Monitoring & Strategy Committee, INEC
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.0 Introduction

The conduct of free, fair, and credible elections is the most important mandate of any EMB. Safeguarding and defending the transparency and integrity of the electoral process within constitutional and legal framework is a sacred responsibility vested in INEC in order to nurture, sustain and continuously deepen democracy in Nigeria.

The Commission was guided by one fundamental principle in the 15 months period from 9 January 2018 when the timetable and schedule of activities for the 2019 General Election was released to the conclusion of the elections on 27 April 2019 with the supplementary election in the Ajeromi-Ifelodun Federal Constituency in Lagos State. This was the commitment to provide a level playing field to all electoral stakeholders and deliver qualitative and hassle-free electoral services to the electorate in all operations. Preparations for the 2019 General Election involved the following activities:

1.1 Planning, Supervision and Monitoring Tools

Critical to ensuring maximum coordination, efficiency and effectiveness
of the preparations for the conduct of the 2019 General Election were the tools designed, developed and deployed for planning, monitoring and implementation of electoral activities. These include the SP and SPA covering the period 2017 – 2021, the 2019 EPP and the EMSC for organising the required personnel, materials and resources for the 2019 General Election.

1.2 Continuous Voter Registration (CVR)

CVR was undertaken from 27th April 2017 to 31st August 2018 at 1,446 designated centres (including offices) nationwide on a continuous basis as prescribed by law. At the end of the exercise and following laid down procedures, the Commission verified and confirmed 14,283,734 new registrants bringing the total number of certified registered voters for the 2019 General Election to 84,004,084.

1.3 Collection of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs)

The Commission put in place measures, including the devolution of collection of PVCs at ward level from 17th to 21st January 2019 to enable eligible but registered citizens collect their PVCs as a requirement for voting. A cumulative total of 72,775,502 (86.63%) PVCs were collected by the time the exercise was suspended just prior to the 2019 General Election.

1.4 Political Party Activities

The Commission registered new political parties, bringing the total number to 91. It also monitored the congresses and primaries of these parties across the country from 18th August to 7th October 2018. At the end of the exercise, the Commission processed the nomination forms of 24,353 candidates (male 21,190 – 87% and female 3,163 – 13%) vying for 1,558 elective offices.
## Constituencies for the 2019 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Vacancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorship</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senatorial</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State House of Assembly</td>
<td>991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT Chairmanship</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT Councillorship</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,558</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Breakdown of Candidates Nominated by political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Election</th>
<th>No of Candidates</th>
<th><strong>Number of Candidates</strong></th>
<th><strong>Percentage</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67 (91.8%)</td>
<td>6 (8.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vice Presidential</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>51 (69.9%)</td>
<td>22 (30.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governorship</strong></td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>986 (92.5%)</td>
<td>80 (7.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Governorship</strong></td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>791 (74.2%)</td>
<td>275 (25.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senatorial</strong></td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>1,670 (87.7%)</td>
<td>234 (12.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>House of Representatives</strong></td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>4,137 (88.4%)</td>
<td>543 (11.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Houses of Assembly</strong></td>
<td>14,580</td>
<td>12,708 (87.2%)</td>
<td>1,872 (12.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCT Chairmanship</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>92 (87.6%)</td>
<td>13 (12.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCT Deputy Chairmanship</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>76 (72.4%)</td>
<td>29 (27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCT Councillorship</strong></td>
<td>701</td>
<td>612 (87.3%)</td>
<td>89 (12.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>24,353</td>
<td>21,190 (87.0%)</td>
<td>3,163 (13.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 Election Security
The Commission undertook ERA from 1st June 2018 to 9th January 2019. Based on the outcome assessment, it engaged with security agencies through ICCES at National, State and LGA levels for purposes of planning, training and deployment of security personnel for duty to secure the elections.

1.6 Stakeholder Engagements
The important role of stakeholders in advancing the electoral and political processes makes it imperative that the Commission engages with them at various levels. There were regular meetings with political parties, CSOs and the media, as well as with Ministries, Departments and Agencies of government such as the NYSC, FRSC, EFCC, ICPC, NPopC, NIMC, NCC and NigComSat. This is in addition to interactive sessions with traditional rulers and FBOs at national, state and LGA levels as well as collaboration with the international community and development partners such as the ECES, IFES, UNDP and others. These engagements and interactive sessions proved valuable to the conduct of the elections.

1.7 Funding
Adequate and timely release of funds are essential for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. A budgetary allocation of N189,007,272,393.00k was released to the Commission for the conduct of the 2019 General Election. This translates to N2,249 ($6.24) per voter which is well within the internationally acceptable ACRVI that ranges from $1 to $3 in established and stable democracies, $4 to $8 in transitional democracies and to more than $9 in post-conflict countries.

1.8 Electoral Legal Framework
Elections are governed by law. INEC derives its powers from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The Commission also has power to issue regulations/guidelines and manuals for the conduct of electoral activities. Following the comprehensive review of the 2015 General Election, the Commission submitted extensive proposals for the improvement of the electoral legal framework for the consideration of the 8th National Assembly. In spite of assurances by the NASS leadership that the required amendments to the Electoral Act will be
concluded by December 2016, the process dragged on for so long and could not be concluded before the General Election. The impact of this was a delay in the revision and production of regulations and guidelines as well as the training manuals for the conduct of elections.

1.9 Procurement and Logistics

Electoral activities are time-bound. The organisation and management of procurement and logistics in a timely manner is fundamental for success. In spite of efforts to facilitate early commencement for the procurement and distribution of election materials, as well as for the prompt recruitment, training and deployment of poll officials, the Commission had to contend several challenges before and during the elections. Specific challenges are highlighted in the subsequent chapters of this report.

2.0 The 2019 General election

The 2019 General Election (Presidential, National Assembly, Governorship, State Houses of Assembly and FCT Area Councils election) is the largest electoral exercise undertaken by any Electoral Commission in the history of Nigeria. The election was contested by 24,353 candidates nominated by 90 (out of 91) political parties for 1,558 constituencies and with a voter population of 84,004,084 spread across 176,996 poling units and voting points located across Nigeria.

The Presidential and National Assembly elections were originally scheduled for 16th February 2019, while the Governorship, State Houses of Assembly and FCT Area Council Election was to take place two weeks later on 2nd March 2019. The elections were however rescheduled to 23rd February 2019 and 9th March 2019 respectively due to the following operational and logistics reasons:

i. Continuous efforts at adhering to court judgments to preclude unlawful exclusion. The Commission received 186 petitions from political parties as well as 584 requests for certified true copies (CTC) of reports on party congresses, primaries, nomination forms of candidates and other documents and dragged to court 639 times on pre-election matters.

ii. Sheer volume and weight of required sensitive election materials – over 500 million print runs.

iii. Inadequate local capacity for the production of sensitive election materials within the available timeframe.

iv. Micro – customisation of sensitive election materials (Ballot Papers and Result Sheets) to protect the sanctity of the vote and the credibility of the elections.

v. Inadequate transportation and infrastructural facilities, as well as inclement weather conditions for the
safe and timely delivery of sensitive election materials to locations between the time of delivery and the scheduled time for commencement of polls.

vi. Fire incidents in INEC State office in Anambra and LGA offices in Qua’an Pan and Isiala Ngwa South of Plateau and Abia States respectively in which sensitive election materials were destroyed and required replacement for election to take place.

That the elections took place as scheduled on 23rd February 2019 and 9th March 2019 respectively was largely attributable to the remedial actions embarked upon by the Commission. First is the deployment of all critical national assets to address the issue of logistics expeditiously. The Commission is grateful for the support received from the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Nigerian Air Force, Nigeria Customs Service, National Airspace Management Authority, Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria etc. Secondly was the ability of the Commission to speedily and effectively mitigate the adverse effect of the fire incidence across the country in which sensitive election materials were destroyed.

### 3.0 Schedule of the Elections

The 2019 General Election which took place between 23rd February and 9th March 2019 are as follows:


iii. Supplementary elections for Governorship in six States, 41 Constituencies in 17 States and four Area Councils in the FCT were concluded on 23rd March 2019. Similarly, supplementary elections were held in four State Constituencies in Rivers State on 13th April 2019 and in one Federal Constituency in Lagos State on 27th April 2019 following a court case.
Facts and Figures for the 2019 General Election

- **Political Parties**: 91
- **Registered Voters**: 84,004,084
- **Collected PVCs**: 72,775,502 (86.63%)
- **Uncollected PVCs**: 11,228,582 (13.37%)
- **Electoral Constituencies**: 1,558
- **LGAs**: 774
- **RAs/Wards**: 8,809
- **Polling Units**: 119,973
- **Voting Points & Settlements**: 57,023
- **SCRs Deployed**: 176,996
- **Back-up SCRs**: 17,001
- **Ad hoc Electoral Personnel**: 821,686
- **Accredited International Observers**: 39 Groups with 2,306 observers
- **Accredited Domestic Observers**: 120 Groups with 71,256 observers
- **Candidates Nominated by Political Parties**: 24,353
4.0 The Post-Election Reviews

Following the conduct of the 2019 General Election, the Commission mandated its PMSC, in collaboration with other Committees and relevant Departments, Directorates and Units, to undertake a comprehensive review of all activities, processes and procedures of the elections. The review exercise was designed to evaluate the conduct of the 2019 General Election and learn vital lessons. The objective was to provide the Commission with the opportunity to reflect and review its policies and programmes in the effort to enhance and strengthen the electoral process going forward.

5.0 The Review Process

The post-2019 General Election review took place over a period of six weeks from 28th May to 12th July 2019. It involved both internal reviews within the Commission based on a bottom-up approach and external reviews with all electoral stakeholders. The timeline of the review activities are as follows:
Pre-review meeting with RECs  
28th May 2019

Review meetings at the 36 States and FCT  
30th May to 19th June, 2019

Review meeting with EOs  
23rd and 26th June 2019

Review meeting with Political Parties  
1st July 2019

Review meeting with ICCES  
2nd July 2019

Review meeting with CSOs  
3rd July 2019

Review meeting with the Media  
4th July 2019

Review meeting with Line Editors of media organisations  
8th July 2019

Review meeting with selected CO and RO  
9th July 2019

Review meeting with AS and Directors  
10th July 2019

Retreat with RECs  
11th July 2019

Post-retreat meeting of the Commission  
12th July 2019
6.0 Issues under Review

This Report is presented in 16 chapters reflecting substantive issues discussed at the review meetings and arranged in a thematic order preceded by an introduction and concluded with a summary of recommendations as follows:

i. Introduction

ii. General State of Preparedness for the 2019 General Election

iii. Voter Registration Process and PVC Collection

iv. Voter Education, Publicity and External Engagements

v. Recruitment, Training and Deployment of Election Personnel

vi. Transportation: Movement of Personnel and Materials

vii. ICT: SCRs, Tablets, Internet Services, etc.

viii. Procurement and Deployment of Election Materials

ix. Election Day Processes

x. Reverse Logistics: Retrieval of Field Assets

xi. Election Security

xii. Election Monitoring and Support Centre

xiii. Impact of the Legal Framework

xiv. Conclusion

xv. Recommendations
Cross section of Vice Chancellors at the 2019 General Election Review Meeting with Collation Officers, held on 9th July 2019 in Lagos.

INEC Chairman, Prof. Mahmood Yakubu, National Commissioners Muhammed Mustafa Lecky and Prof. Antonia Okoosi-Simbine at the 2019 General Election Review Meeting with Collation Officers, held on 9th July 2019 in Lagos.
Chairman, Lagos State branch of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), Mr. Quasim Akinreti speaks at the 2019 General Election Review Meeting with the Media, held on 8th July in Lagos.
Chapter 2

General State Of Preparedness
2.0 Preamble

The conduct of a general election is a huge undertaking for any country more so for Nigeria given its landmass, difficult terrain, quality of infrastructure, behaviour of the political actors, size of the voter population, the number of constituencies into which elections are conducted as well as the large number of electoral officials, observers and security agents to be deployed.

Preparations for the 2019 General Election began with the release of the approved election Timetable and Schedule of Activities. These preparations were germane to the success of an election as all the activities involved could be described as the fulcrum around which free, fair and credible elections revolve.

The conversations on the general state of preparedness were largely held within the Commission involving its desk and field officers i.e. EOs, ASs, Directors, RECs as well as other staff at the National, State and LGA levels. These discussions focused mainly on the state of preparations, and more specifically, on conditions of electoral materials, storage facilities, delimitation, challenges and recommendations for strengthening of processes and procedures.

2.1 Main Issues

2.1.1 Condition of Electoral Materials

Many of the non-sensitive materials were kept in deplorable conditions while some were damaged and unusable before the 2019 General Election. Meanwhile, in its bid to ensure the materials were used for the election, the Commission carried out an audit of the stores with a view to ascertaining the actual status of materials in stock. State offices were also directed to clear the stores of obsolete materials and send the quantities of materials required to the Headquarters to plan for procurement. While such audits were conducted to ascertain the quantity and quality of existing and re-useable materials for the election and the need to begin such audits early in the Electoral Cycle, the review meeting emphasised the significance of proper storage and the early supply of election materials among some of the most salient issues affecting preparations for elections.

2.1.2 Condition of Storage Facilities and Related Activities

The provision of suitable and conducive storage facilities for electoral materials was a major issue raised by stakeholders and is essential to the enhancement of quality of electoral process. It is against this background that the Commission provides storage facilities at zonal and State levels as well as the majority of LGA offices nationwide. These were, as much as it was practicable, activated before 2019 General Election.

At various levels of discussions during the review meetings, it was noted that these facilities were inadequate or even unavailable, especially in the LGAs without prototype offices. Even where
the facilities existed, the huge number of political parties that participated in the 2019 General Election increased the quantities of materials and consequently placed severe pressure on the available storage spaces. It was further noted, that the stores lacked some essential facilities such as functional air conditioners that may help maintain the quality of materials kept in them.

2.1.3 Condition of Collation Centres, RACs and PUs

Collation centres, RACs and PUs are expected to be located in line with the approved guidelines by the Commission. For instance, Collation Centres/RACs and PUs were to be located in public buildings, in a place central in an RA where perimeter fencing, electricity and water supplies, toilets etc. are available.

Efforts were made towards the preparation for the 2019 election to ensure that RACs/Collation Centres were located in tandem with the guidelines approved by the Commission. Requests were sent to the States to update the Commission with their current status. Though this was done, verification of the reports could not be done before the election. Not surprising, stakeholders made this observations at the review meeting. Many of the RACs/Collation Centres and PUs were located in public buildings owned by the various State Governments across the country. Most of them were in deplorable condition during the 2019 General Election. Some were even located in places such as private buildings which the Commission had to relocate to public facilities prior to the election in line with extant policy. Furthermore, a lot of the buildings were without perimeter fence and situated in porous locations that were not easily accessible to voters and vulnerable to attacks by political thugs and hoodlums on Election Day.

2.1.4 Delimitation

The Nigerian Constitution empowers the Commission to carry out a review of constituencies in an interval of not less than 10 years, create PUs and determine the boundaries of electoral Wards in the FCT. The present constituencies were delimited by the defunct NECON in 1996. Since then, no constituency delimitation has been undertaken. Even the Commission’s efforts to create additional

Many of the RACs/ Collation Centres and PUs were located in public buildings owned by the various State Governments across the country

PUs in 2014 and VPs in 2018 had to be suspended amidst heated debate among stakeholders.
PUs, which are the basic and most important level of electoral activities, were last created in 1996 although there have been cases of relocation of citizens from one place to another, population growth and the emergence of new settlements. The number of PUs in Nigeria today stands at 119,973. To improve on the participation of citizens (electorate) in electoral activities, the Commission had tried to increase the number of PUs in line with the provision of Section 42 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). This was done by creating proximate voting locations to decongest existing PUs. Accordingly, VPs were created in 2015 followed in 2016 by VP(S) in FCT to cater for new settlements unserved by existing PUs and VPs.

3.0 Challenges

The stakeholders drew attention to some of the challenges in the build-preparations for the elections viz:

i. In the course of clearing the State stores, some materials that were supposed to be preserved such as ballot boxes were all cleared without considering their usability for the conduct of future elections. Some State offices later requested HQ for the same items. The Commission had to make emergency arrangements for their procurement and delivery to the States which added to the pressure on the eve of the elections.

ii. The delivery of sensitive materials for the 2019 General Election was to a
great extent faced with challenges due partly to late budgetary approval and release of funds to the Commission, resulting in late delivery by vendors.

iii. Mix-up of some sensitive election materials during the course of delivery to States, especially for the Presidential election. There were mix-ups in packaging of materials produced by the vendors in spite of in situ supervision by Commission’s officials at the point of production in order to ensure correct packaging and labelling. This caused delays in the distribution of materials to the designated locations.

iv. Sorting of materials became a challenge due to the fact that it was difficult to identify some materials from the packages delivered. Some of the boxes had to be broken for proper identification of their contents. This led to the diversion of materials to the wrong locations and consequently the late delivery of same thereby necessitating the eventual rescheduling of the election by one week from Saturday 16th February 2019 to Saturday 23rd February 2019.

v. Distance between the zonal stores to some State offices, e.g. Osogbo to Lagos, Sokoto to Jigawa, Port Harcourt to Uyo and Minna to Ilorin was identified as an encumbrance to speedy/prompt delivery of election materials.

vi. Inadequate storage facilities at different State, LGAs and RAC levels which necessitated warehousing of materials in zonal stores and the logistics required for moving them to the States.

vii. Poor carbonisation and over-customisation/labelling of result sheets and quality of consumables such as ink, toner and other cartridges.

viii. On the state of public buildings used as RACs/Collation Centres and PUs, the Commission informed stakeholders that the matter was raised when it briefed the CS on preparations for the 2019 General Election. At the meeting, the Governors were receptive to the idea. Effort was made to coordinate their intervention through the NEC of which all State Governors are also members. However, these efforts were overtaken by myriad of activities in the run-up to the elections.

ix. Failure on the part of some EOs to release dedicated funds for proper activation of RACs/Collation Centres and to ensure the involvement of Heads of schools in RAC management.
Chapter 3
Voter Registration & PVC Collection
3.0 Preamble

The credibility of an election depends to a large extent on a credible register of voters. INEC ensured that a credible register for the 2019 General Election was certified through the continuous registration of eligible voters in compliance with Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). The Commission further made arrangements for the collection of PVCs starting with the backlog of 2011, 2014 as well as the new cards for voters registered in 2017 and 2018. In addition, and in compliance with the law, the voters’ list was displayed for claims and objections to enable the clean-up of the register in readiness for the elections.

However, the process of certification of the voter’s register was not without challenges as pointed out by stakeholders during the review. These challenges mainly relate to the continuous voter registration exercise, display of the voters’ register for claims and objections, printing of the register and the collection PVCs by voters.

3.1 Main Issues

3.1.1 Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) Process

CVR for the 2019 General Election commenced nationwide on 27th April 2017 and was suspended on 31st August 2018. The exercise commenced with a centre in each of the 774 LGAs. Following complaints that the centres were inadequate, the Commission created an additional 667 centres across the country, bringing the number to 1,441. Some of the centres were rotated as registration officials moved from one community to another in order to make it easier for prospective registrants.

The CVR exercise was meant to capture those that turned 18 years of age since the last updating of the register in 2014, those that were 18 years or above that did not register earlier and those that were registered but whose names were not on the Voters’ Register for one reason or another. In addition, the exercise also provided registered voters the opportunity to apply for transfer of their registrations in the event of relocation to places other than those where they originally registered and replacement of lost or damaged PVCs as well as those who wished to correct wrong entries of personal details such as name, age, gender etc. A total 14,283,734 new voters were registered and added to the existing register.

During the review meetings with stakeholders, participants commended the Commission for conducting the voter registration exercise as envisaged by the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), thereby enabling those that met the voting age the opportunity to register. The new register of 84,004,084 voters was published before the election.

3.1.2 Display of Voter Register for Claims and Objections

In line with the requirements of the
Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), the Commission is required to display the register for a period of 5-7 days for claims and objections by citizens. In compliance, the Commission displayed the register in all the 8,809 electoral Wards nationwide from 6th - 12th November 2018. At the end of the exercise, a total of 100,529 claims and objections were made out of which 42,481 were deceased persons whose names were on the register. Most of these claims were made by family members supported, in some cases, by funeral brochures of the deceased voters. There were no objections received by the Commission in respect of the appearance of names on the register. Names of deceased persons were nulled from the register and there were no reported cases of such persons appearing for voting at PUs on Election Day.

3.1.3 Permanent Voters Card (PVC) Collection

Following the large number of uncollected PVCs from previous registration exercises, the Commission made the collection of unclaimed PVCs an integral part of the fresh voter registration. Initially, this was done at LGA level. The exercise was later cascaded to the 1,441 CVR centres and before the 2019 General Election, the collection of cards was devolved to RA level for a week, including the weekend. The Commission insisted on personal collection rather than distribution of the PVCs. The latter implies collection by proxy with the risk that the cards may end up in the wrong hands. Out of a total of 84,004,084 registered voters, 72,775,502 (86.63%) PVCs were collected, leaving the Commission with 11,228,582 (13.37%) cards uncollected.

3.1.4 Printing of Voters’ Register

The Commission printed three sets of the voters’ register (one in colour and two sets in black and white) for elections. The copy in colour was ticked off on Election Day as voters were accredited and issued with ballot papers while the set in black was displayed at the PUs for ease of cross checking of voting locations by voters on Election Day. The third copy was kept as redundancy to be used in case of emergency. The printing of the registers is done by regular staff of the Commission using facilities provided at the State offices nationwide. This responsibility is considered sensitive and therefore not outsourced.

3.2 Challenges

The Reports from the State offices and other stakeholders show that there
were challenges experienced in certain aspects of the CVR process, display of voters’ register for claims and objections, PVC collection and printing of voters’ register for the election. Some of these challenges are:

i. Slow processing speed of the DDCMs during registration as a result of low processing capacity of the machines and system RAM size.

ii. Limited data storage capacity of installed hard disk.

iii. Freezing/hanging of the DDCMs due system inability to handle or isolate faulty/ degrading peripherals.

iv. False duplicate records detection during registration by AFIS running on DDCMs.

v. Fingerprint capturing difficulties due to faulty or degrading fingerprint scanners.

vi. Difficulty in identifying multiple registration. The software for data capture has become dated thereby generating errors during data capture requiring new patches intermittently. The software could not effectively check multiple registrations on the system.

vii. The inadequate number of registration centres for CVR which also double as collection points for PVCs. This led to overcrowding and agitation by registered voters. Other challenges were the long distances to/from the centres, age-old communal conflicts which necessitated the creation of additional centres or rotation of the centres and difficult terrains.

viii. Attempts by some communities and politicians to register ineligible persons or registration by proxy.

ix. Inadequate monitoring and supervision also affected the smooth running of the exercise. There are reports of inadequate or improper monitoring of the exercise by the management staff in some States. There are cases where the EOs were not found on their duty posts to supervise the exercise.

x. There are reports of poor turnout of
registrants for claims and objections. The objective of display of registers of voters at the end of every registration cycle and before the 2019 General Election was to clean up the register i.e. to identify and null ineligible or deceased voters. During the display there were only 51,121 claims and 49,408 objections out of which 42,481 were deceased voters. In addition, the NIS confiscated PVCs and TVCs from 72 aliens (non-Nigerian citizens). On its own, the Commission detected 72,621 voters registered with still pictures (as against pictures captured on a webcam at the point of registration), 3,305 apparently under-aged registrants and 2,929 multiple registrations, making a total of 179,456. All the records were nulled from the register. For a voters’ register of 84,004,084, this comes to 0.2%.

xi. Identifying non-Nigerians and ineligible registrants by registration officials was quite difficult. So too was ascertaining the number of deceased persons on the register in the absence of official records of birth and death in the country. This challenge needs to be resolved before the next cycle of registration.

xii. External backup batteries and generators were provided to complement the national power grid for the CVR process. However, reports show that some LGAs were running constantly on generators as there was no public power supply. Consequently, the batteries could not be recharged hence the generators were the main sources of power supply. Budgetary provisions for servicing and fuelling generators were usually exhausted within the first month of the process.

xiii. Adequacy and quality of the consumables for the CVR exercise such as ink cartridges, paper and cold laminate were a major challenge, thereby slowing down the pace of the registration exercise.

xiv. Insecurity in some parts of the country was a major challenge to the smooth conduct of the exercise, especially in the North-East and some parts of the Niger Delta. The CVR should be sufficiently protected for the safety of officials and to prevent unscrupulous individuals from hijacking the process.

xv. Delay in printing of PVCs and multiple productions of some cards for an individual were serious issues that need to be addressed by the Commission. It takes several months for PVCs to be printed after registration. This delay in printing contributed a lot to the problem of uncollected PVCs as some registrants might have relocated to other areas and they may find it difficult going to collect their PVCs in another distant location.

xvi. Procurement of materials for the CVR process and the printing of voters’ register for election were cumbersome and bureaucratic.
Chapter 4
Voter Education, Publicity & External Engagements
4.0 Preamble

Proactive dissemination of information to the general public on voter education and all aspects of the electoral process are among the core functions of INEC as provided for by the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and elaborated in the Commission’s revised Communication Policy. The Commission’s 2017-2021 SP enumerates several voter education and publicity objectives which were broken down into a series of activities under the 2019 EPP. Most of them were implemented.

The Commission has, since November 2015, deliberately undertaken improved measures to strengthen its voter education and information dissemination processes. In terms of publicity, the Commission introduced and sustained regular press briefings and issuance of Press Statements to distil its actions, decisions and policies emanating from either its regular weekly meetings or in response to enquiries from the media,
other stakeholders and the general public. Designated officials granted several interviews and participated in live and special programmes. The 90-member INEC Press Corps at the headquarters received regular briefings and also took part in two major capacity-building workshops. They were also directly involved in the coverage of many off-season elections. The Commission also escalated the use of its social media platforms and online newspaper to provide information in a timely fashion and respond to enquiries derived from the feedback channels.

With regards to voter education, the Commission implemented several initiatives before and during the 2019 General Election. These included capacity-building workshops for Heads of Voter Education and Publicity Department (VEP) and line officers in the States, women groups and the use of NYSC members as INEC Ambassadors at LGA and community levels. Several stakeholders, including CSOs (especially those focusing on gender issues), the media, professional bodies, youth organisations, traditional rulers and religious leaders participated in interactive sensitisation programmes organised by the Commission.

A number of campaigns against electoral violence/malpractices and vote buying were undertaken in collaboration with the NOA. These also involved town criers, community informants and local drummers. There were market outreaches in all the Senatorial districts across the federation. Special sessions were held with targeted groups such as PWDs and regulatory bodies. Cine Rovers were deployed for public enlightenment. Sensitisation programmes were also taken to campuses of tertiary institutions where youth ambassadors were inducted. There were also engagements with political parties on the mainstreaming of women.

Printed and audio-visual enlightenment materials such as jingles, songs, animations, posters, leaflets, booklets, banners, assistive aids in the form of braille, magnifying glasses, and commentaries were produced.

4.1 Main Issues

With regard to voter education and publicity, the review meetings focused on
the following issues:

i. Publicity and mobilisation for the election at the headquarters, States and LGAs.

ii. Timing, adequacy and effectiveness of voter education activities

iii. Engagement with relevant stakeholders.

iv. Procedure for accreditation of media organisations.

v. Access to information on INEC and its officials before and on Election Day.

vi. Conduct and experiences of voters on Election Day, especially PWs.

vii. Voter turnout.

viii. Conduct and experiences of polling agents, security personnel, candidates and political party chieftains.

ix. Collation and declaration of results.

x. Fake news and hate speech.

xi. Responsibilities of INEC.

xii. Number of political parties.

xiii. Prosecution of offenders.

xiv. Legal framework.

xv. Election technology.

xvi. Campaign finance and expenditure.

4.2 Challenges and Observations

4.2.1 Procedure for Accreditation of Media Organisations

There were complaints that the process of registration for media accreditation could have been better organized while the quality identity cards issued to the media should be improved.

4.2.2 Access to Information on INEC and its Officials before and on Election Day

Participants commended INEC on this score. However, they argued that the Commission should have informed them on the decision to postpone the Presidential and National Assembly elections earlier than it did. This, they argued, would have doused the tension that the announcement created. The Commission was advised to open up more channels of communication and suggested that the INEC Chairman gets a twitter handle.

4.2.3 Adequacy and Effectiveness of Public Enlightenment and Voter Education

While participants commended the Commission for extending the period of PVC collection, they observed that it did not handle the collection process efficiently and effectively because registered voters were moving from one point to another in search of their PVCs.
The review meeting acknowledged that the various stakeholder meetings held with traditional and religious leaders, professional bodies, trade unions, the market and campus outreaches, the use of INEC ambassadors and press conferences increased awareness among the registered voters. Participants encouraged the Commission to continue to do more in order to build public confidence and be seen as an unbiased organisation committed to the public interest.

4.2.4 Conduct of Voters on Election Day, Including Turnout of Persons Living With Disabilities (PWDs) & Other Vulnerable Persons

There were complaints that the process of registration for media accreditation could have been better organized while the quality identity cards issued to the media should be improved.

Media professionals asked the Commission to consider the possibility of allowing some categories of voters to cast their ballots at least two days to the Election Day as practiced in some countries. While they noted that voters came out in large numbers to vote in the Presidential and National Assembly elections, they averred that the turnouts in subsequent elections was low. They observed that some individuals sold their votes, which is a pointer to the need for a more aggressive voter education. Some voters found it difficult to differentiate between the logos of some political parties that appeared similar on the crowded ballot paper. A participant narrated his experience at three PUs in Ekiti State where “the aged could not identify the political parties of their choice on the ballot paper”.

There was a consensus that PWDs were largely accommodated. However, there were no Braille ballot guides for individuals with sight challenges. It was also observed that some politicians were escorted to PUs by security agents who discouraged some voters from coming out to cast their votes. Participants at the review meeting affirmed that poll officials opened most of the PUs on time which aided the peace and orderliness in many of them.

4.2.5 Conduct and Experience of Party Agents, Security Personnel, Candidate and Chieftains of Political Parties

Comments by participants indicated that political party agents were seen at the PUs and other levels of collation. Some
of them exhibited conflicting characters. On the one hand, some of them behaved like traders looking for customers and their sincerity to the political parties they represented was questionable. On the other hand, some party agents behaved as if they were accredited to perpetrate thuggery. At the PUs where they lost, they facilitated the disruption of the process.

Security agents were deployed but while some of them conducted themselves well, others did not. Participants at the review meeting cited many cases where security personnel harassed journalists and collaborated with politicians to aid vote buying. Some participants also described the role of the Police as “a disaster” in some areas. In Bayelsa, as in other States in the South South geopolitical zone, thugs and gangs intimidated voters and other stakeholders on Election Day. But the violence and intimidation were not limited to the South South alone. In the North Central and North West geopolitical zones, cases of intimidation were also recorded.

They were also reported cases of candidates and political parties intimidating either COs or ROs by compelling them to declare their candidates and parties as winners of elections under duress. The case of Imo West Senatorial District was cited as an example.

4.2.6 Collation and Declaration of Results

Results were collated and winners were returned. However, some INEC COs and ROs drawn from the universities performed below expectation. Again, the conduct of the RO for Imo State Governorship election, Imo North and Abia North Senatorial Districts were mentioned.

4.2.7 Fake News and Hate Speech

Stakeholders at the review meeting observed that the NPC cannot discipline erring journalists because of its advisory role. However, it was noted that some media organisations were sanctioned by NBC for various infractions. One of the participants said that while it is true that negative news sells, journalists have a duty to publish success stories for a balance. He encouraged INEC to introduce the concept of embedded journalism before elections and take editors to communities where there is no electricity or access roads to make them appreciate the geographical and other environmental challenges faced by the Commission in such communities as opposed to perceptions and assumptions. By doing so, they will have a better appreciation of how infrastructural challenges affect elections and put journalists in a better position to write from a well-informed point of view.

4.3 General Issues

General issues bordering on the responsibilities of INEC were discussed. The Commission was commended by stakeholders for conducting inclusive elections, holding press briefings and interactions with the media before, during and after elections. However,
they observed that INEC should provide efficient, safe and effective means of transporting election officials, adequate security for personnel and materials and improve the welfare of ad hoc staff, especially at the RACs. They also suggested a reduction in the number of political parties and advocated for independent candidacy.

On election campaigns, stakeholders argued that the concept of Presidential Debate should be taken seriously. They urged INEC to sanction any candidate who fails to appear at such debate. They also called for the swift arrest and prompt prosecution of electoral offenders and pointed to the urgency establishing an Independent Commission/Tribunal to try electoral offenders which many of them insisted was long overdue.

On election technology, they advised that it was high time Nigeria adopted electronic voting and transmission of results while INEC should spearhead a major reform of the electoral legal framework as a matter of urgency.
Chapter 5
Political Parties & Election Observation
5.0  Preamble

Active engagement with political parties is one of the philosophical foundations of the Commission’s SP, SPA as well as the 2019 EPP. Other stakeholders which the Commission interfaces with include CSOs and the media.

Political parties are central to the electoral process. This is even more so in Nigeria where the legal framework has no provision for independent candidates. Since the work of an EMB centres on the conduct of election and provision of the enabling environment for electoral activities, political parties are unarguably at the heart of the process.

Equally crucial are CSOs and the media. They are significant not just as watchdogs in the electoral process but also in conferring legitimacy and credibility to election and its outcome. In the run up to the 2019 General Election, the Commission had several engagements with these critical stakeholders and facilitated a conducive atmosphere for election observation and media coverage. CSOs partnered with the Commission in voter education and those which focus their activities on PWDs helped to mobilise their members to participate actively in the elections. They also partnered with the Commission in the provision of assistive tools (braille, magnifying glasses etc.) to ease voting by physically challenged voters.

5.1  Main Issues

The key issues discussed with these external stakeholders include engagement with political parties, accreditation and conduct of polling agents in the election, the compliance of political parties with campaign finance regulations, engagement with foreign and domestic observers as well as the distribution of election observation kits and materials.

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“Other stakeholders which the Commission interfaces with include CSOs and the media.”
5.1.1 Engagement with Political Parties and IPAC

There were 91 political parties prior to the 2019 General Election. They were registered at different times by the Commission. Forty-nine (49) of them were registered by the present Commission between June 2017 and August 2018. Twelve (12) parties earlier de-registered were re-registered by Court order between December 2015 and November 2017 while the remaining thirty (30) parties were registered between 1998 and 2014. Out of the 91 registered political parties, 90 nominated candidates for elective positions at different levels in the 2019 General Election.

Political parties relate with the Commission on individual basis but may also do so through collective representation under the auspices of their umbrella body, IPAC. As the registrar and regulator of political parties, the Commission monitors their activities, including meetings, congresses, primaries and conventions. It also monitors their finances.

When intra-party conflict/crisis arises, the Commission was sometimes invited to intervene and, in such instances, the Commission’s Department responsible for ADR facilitated the resolution of such crises.

The Code of Conduct for political parties gave the Commission an observer status in IPAC’s General Assembly. The observer status enables the Commission to attend IPAC’s regular meetings (when invited) and also during their elections. The Code of Conduct also provides that IPAC shall collaborate with the Commission in undertaking voter education. This was accomplished during the 2019 General Election.

Another issue in relation to political parties is the accreditation and issuance
of polling agents’ identification tags for elections. As part of the standard practice to enhance transparency in the elections, every political party is entitled to have an agent at every PU where it sponsors a candidate and the collation centres as well. How well the process of accreditation of polling agents was managed during the election was indeed one of the issues discussed at the review meeting.

It was observed that the Commission did not pay much attention to campaign finance in line with the provisions of the law. The law provides not only for limit to contributions by individuals to candidate/political parties, it also sets limit on spending by candidates for different types of elective offices.

Prior to the 2019 General Election, the Commission promised to undertake extensive monitoring and tracking of party and campaign finance. The Commission also promised to ensure that political parties comply with provisions of the Electoral Act and collaborated with other relevant agencies accordingly.

To facilitate compliance, the Commission considered it imperative to design and distribute the various reporting forms to political parties. These forms were distributed before the commencement of electioneering campaigns.

Secondly, the Commission also embarked upon extensive training for both staff and relevant officials of political parties on their financial reporting obligations and how to complete the campaign finance forms. With funding support from IFES, ECES and collaboration with NIPSS, four sensitisation/training workshops were organised for National Chairmen, Financial Secretaries and other leaders of the political parties. Relevant Staff of the Commission were also trained on how to track the expenses of the candidates/political parties. How well this project was carried out and the challenges encountered were some of the issues discussed at the review meetings.

5.1.2 Engagement with Observers

As earlier alluded to, engagement with observers, as a key segment of CSOs involvement in electoral activities, was a
critical aspect in the preparation, conduct and post-election evaluation of the 2019 General Election.

To enhance and facilitate the unhindered observation of elections, the Commission reviewed the guidelines for election observation in 2018 by improving on the online application platform introduced in 2014 to complement the manual option. The Commission also continued to provide observation kits and relevant literature to all accredited observers.

Although a number of requirements were listed in the call for application sent to domestic and foreign observer groups, the Commission ensured that both old and new groups were accredited. Meanwhile, special invitation was also extended to some international bodies to observe the 2019 General Election. These include the Commonwealth, EU, AU, ECOWAS and ECONEC. In addition, many embassies on their own responded to the advertisement and call for application by the Commission.

At the close of receipt of applications, a total of 335 groups, comprising of 293 domestic and 42 foreign, applied for accreditation to observe the election. Out of these, the Commission accredited 130 domestic and 39 foreign groups. All the 169 observer groups collectively deployed a total of 73,562 field observers across the country. Out of this figure, 71,256 were from the domestic groups while 2,306 were from the foreign groups, including those on special invitation. Further disaggregation indicates that 51,320 out of the 71,256 domestic observers were males while 19,936 were females. For the foreign groups, 1,711 were males while 595 were females.

Meanwhile, the Commission had procured a number of observer kits to enhance field observation. These kits include customised jackets, identity cards, face caps, electoral information pack, jotters, pens and vehicle election duty stickers. The arrangement was to ensure that each observer was issued individually with these items while election duty car stickers and information pack (in flash drives) were issued to each observer group based on the number of personnel they deployed. Again, how well the distribution of kits was managed

To facilitate compliance, the Commission considered it imperative to design and distribute the various reporting forms to the political parties. These forms were distributed before the commencement of campaigns.

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as well as the conduct of the observers were deliberated upon during the review meetings.

5.2 Challenges

5.2.1 Political Parties

Absence of internal democracy as well as non-compliance with party constitutions and the Electoral Act in the management of parties was noted by participants at the various meetings and this contributed to the weakening of popular participation in key party activities, including the conduct of congresses and primaries. Contrary to the provision of their constitutions, most party officials operated more in breach in determining issues of nomination of candidates for election. This was identified by some participants as a factor in the high number defections to other political parties and the large number of pre-election cases in various courts of law across the country.

In many instances, stakeholders noted that a number of the primaries were less than transparent as the issue of lack of internal democracy dominated the manner in which the exercises were handled. Notices were received from 90 out of the 91 political parties. Some of the parties opted for direct primaries while others adopted the indirect methods. The Commission monitored a total of 29,607 primaries for the 991 State Assembly constituencies, 109 senatorial districts, 360 federal constituencies, governorship primaries for 29 States and the national conventions for Presidential primaries.

“Absence of internal democracy as well as non-compliance with party constitutions and the Electoral Act in the management of parties was noted by participants at the various meetings and this contributed to the weakening of popular participation in key party activities, including the conduct of congresses and primaries.”

Observation reports from these primaries showed that they were conducted in almost all cases without membership registers. Notices were also served on the Commission for the conduct of primaries by political parties that had no offices or visible presence in some States. Many parties did not indicate
the venue, time and mode of primaries or rescheduled them several times and eventually held close to the Commission’s deadline. Consequently, nominations were submitted at the eleventh hour, thereby adding to the pressure on the Commission and the attendant risk of exclusion of names from the ballot papers in some constituencies.

Perhaps the greatest challenge was the lack of transparency and inclusivity in candidate nomination by political parties resulting in several litigations. The 2019 General Election recorded a total of 809 cases challenging the outcome of primaries in different parties. Some participants were of the view that the conduct of party primaries and the wanton violence associated with the nomination of candidate impacted negatively on the smooth conduct of the actual election in some States. One of the consequences is the poor gender representation for women and, even worse, of PWDs in elective positions in the country which is a direct reflection of their marginalisation in party affairs. Some leaders of political parties acknowledged this reality and promised restitution through affirmative action.

Another challenge was the late or non-submission of names of polling agents as required by law. EOs across the country noted that late or non-submission of names of polling agents affected planning and processing of accreditation tags. Furthermore, political parties without previous presence in many constituencies and which failed to submit their lists insisted on collecting agents’ tags. It was also observed that agents of some political parties worked for their opponents on Election Day.

For reasons mentioned earlier, tags for polling agents could not be produced early. Many political parties complained of inadequate number of tags for their polling agents. The shortage and late supply of these tags made some leaders of political parties at the review meeting to call on the Commission to give-up on printing tags for party agents. Instead, political parties should be allowed to do so as some them are doing already.

On campaign finance, a number of challenges were identified by stakeholders. These include lack of party offices for many of the contesting candidates/parties in the States, absence of information on campaign offices of candidates, unavailability of information to the Commission on schedules for
campaigns as well as unwillingness to answer to the enquiries of monitoring officers deployed by the Commission to track spending at campaign rallies. Meanwhile, the three months within which parties are required to submit reports on election expenses has not been complied with. All the political parties are in breach.

The large number of political parties in the country was yet another challenge raised by many stakeholders. For the Commission, the number of political parties has implication on the size of ballot papers and result sheets, ballot boxes and logistics for movement of materials to various locations. The customisation of result sheets, particularly the Form EC8 series by type of election was cumbersome. However, stakeholder at the review meetings raised other observations regarding the number of political parties:

i. COs and ROs expressed concern over the high number of political parties and its impact on the accurate and efficient conclusion of Election Day Processes.

ii. The CSOs were concerned about the high number of “wasted and void” votes during the General Election.

Stakeholders, particularly leaders of political parties identified funding as a key challenge to the growth of political parties. For them, lack of public funding was responsible for many of the issues raised, including the failure to comply with statutory requirements on campaign finance and internal democracy. They also argued that public funding is a key to strengthening the institutional capacity of the parties.

5.2.2 Election Observers and CSOs

The first challenge identified relate to the delay in the delivery and distribution of Observer kits. However, some stakeholders attribute this situation to the personalisation of items such as identification tags and the delay in the submission of necessary information including names, photographs and contact details of the field observers by accredited observer groups. Production of these items was customised with colour/number codes by names of organisations and location i.e. State of deployment. This was done to discourage infiltration and fraud.

“Stakeholders, particularly leaders of political parties identified funding as a key challenge to the growth of political parties.”
A related observation was the insistence by the Commission to hand over the kits to individual observers rather than group allocation preferred by some team leaders which was susceptible to abuse based on the Commission’s experience over the years. For instance, some of the observers could not readily mention the names of the groups they represented or even the names of their team leaders.

Some stakeholders decried the incidence of partisanship and collusion between some field observers and politicians. With over 70,000 persons mobilised by accredited observer groups for field observation across the country, they alleged that either politicians infiltrated their ranks or some observers consciously colluded with politicians both during the election and collation of results. They further alleged that the reaction and open comments of some observers over admissibility of ballot (as either valid or invalid) at the PUs and on other issues during collation raised doubts about their neutrality. In a particular State, a known politician was found to have been among the list of observers deployed by a group. The Commission was alerted and the accreditation withdrawn immediately. Thus, issue of neutrality and integrity which are core values for observers was raised especially at the review meetings with CSOs, ASs and RECs.

The review meetings also noted that a number of observers lacked basic knowledge of elections and their roles. The training of observers organised by the Commission was clearly inadequate. However, while the more established observer groups conducted their own training, others did not. The behaviour of some observers during and after the poll raised serious doubts about their competence as well as the capacity of the groups they represented. Some had no observation check list to guide them and lacked the knowledge of the election process in general. Some of them approached INEC LGA offices with request for payment of allowances before proceeding to the field on Election Day.
Chapter 6
Recruitment, Training & Deployment of Electoral Personnel
6.0 Preamble

Since 1998 when the Commission was constitutionally established, ad-hoc staff recruitment training and deployment has been a major Electoral activity conducted to harvest quality personnel with skills and competencies in administering elections in Nigeria. The 2019 General election presented yet another opportunity for the Commission to deal with the issues of recruitment, training and deployment of election personnel.

Elections and electoral processes involve the deployment of a large number of personnel. The Commission’s regular staff of a little over 16,000 cannot meet the requirement of nearly 900,000 officials needed conduct the 2019 General Election. Inevitably, the Commission recruits and trains ad hoc staff for different roles during elections. This is in addition to about half a million security personnel required to protect the process and personnel in conducting the 2019 General Election. It is important to note that over 400,000 Security personnel engaged to secure Election Day activities also require some level of training undertaken by the Commission.

The recruitment and training of election duty staff are guided by two principal considerations as follows:
i. Mode of Recruitment: Issues and Challenges

ii. Timing, Adequacy, the Deployment, Training materials.

Through its Electoral Institute, the Commission has institutionalised the development and implementation of a holistic training plan for elections. Cascade training for ad hoc staff, security personnel, observers, the media and other stakeholders is a critical component of the plan. The Commission’s Electoral Institute conducted the following electoral training for the 2019 General Election:

i. Training of personnel for display of voters’ register and collection of PVCs.


iii. Nationwide root training.

iv. Pre-election training assessment evaluation workshop for HODs (Operations), HODs (ICT) STOs.

v. First level ToT for HQ trainers on cascade training.

vi. ToT for STOs on implementation of State cascade training for security personnel.

vii. Cascade training for election security personnel.

viii. ToT for STOs and ASTOs for implementation of 2019 General Election cascade training.

ix. Training of 774 LGTOs at a location in each of the six geo-political zones.

x. Training of SPOs and EOs.

xi. Training of POs and APOs.

xii. Training of ROs and COs.

xiii. Post-election training assessment workshop.

In conducting the above categories of training aimed at providing quality electoral service delivery to the nation, the Commission recorded a number of successes as acknowledged by some sections of the stakeholders during the
The review meeting. These are:

i. Successful training of a pool of LGTO for effective coordination at the LG level.

ii. Re-training of STOs and their Assistants (with support from IFES).

iii. Successful conduct of training for all categories of poll officials for the smooth conduct of 2019 General Election.

iv. Successful implementation of the cascade training plan for election security personnel nationwide (with support from ECES).

v. Sustainability of the root training nationwide.

6.1 Main Issues

6.1.1 Mode of Recruitment: Issues and Challenges

It is to be noted that the Commission was clear on the sources of personnel to be recruited, stating its preference for NYSC members and final year students of Federal tertiary institutions to serve as the polling team. At the level of SPOs, they were to be drawn from Federal MDAs while COs were sourced from members of the academic staff of Federal universities. However, there were cases of alleged impersonation where shortfalls in the number required occurred, thereby defeating the Commission’s efforts to ensure only adequately trained persons were engaged.

In recruiting COs and ROs from the universities, the Commission relied on nominations from the Vice Chancellors. Unfortunately, in some cases desperate politicians tried to compromise the officials. Where they could not be compromised, they were intimidated before and during the elections which in some cases involved physical attacks and injuries. The largest majority of the officials carried out their responsibilities courageously and diligently.

6.1.2 Timing, Adequacy, the Deployment, Training Materials

The issue of inadequate training for selected ad hoc staff due to absence of training materials like manuals for election officials can be attributed to late release of the Commission’s Regulations and Guidelines for the conduct of 2019 General Election which was also predicated on the protracted controversy over the amendment to the Electoral Act between the NASS and the Executive arm of Government.

One of the major setbacks in the training of electoral official was the indiscriminate substitution of some trained for untrained ad hoc staff by officials of the Commission as noted by stakeholders. This led to lack of standardisation in the selection of ad hoc staff and unfortunately became an avenue for settlement of cronies and family members. Consequently, there were, in some cases, outright inability to operate the SCRs and non-adherence to the Election Day processes and procedures by the ad hoc staff involved.
The Training of a large number of ad hoc staff requires a classroom setting. The only facilities available nationwide for such a large scale training were state-owned public schools. The plan was to have a maximum of 60 participants per class. However, the facilities were inadequate. Furthermore, the authorities concerned often times did not make the schools available during week days as the same schools were busy during the academic session. As a result, training was delayed until after school hours which reduced its duration and efficacy.

6.2 Challenges

Although reports on the conduct of training for the 2019 General Election have shown progressive improvement, some challenges which militated against the effort made towards upscaling the skills and competencies of the ad hoc staff were identified by stakeholders as follows:

i. The management of the recruitment, training and deployment of election personnel was difficult. Although the Commission identified the number of staff required, most of the training centres were inundated by a large number of people far above what the Commission had envisaged. Many saw it as an opportunity to earn some income in the light of high unemployment in the country thus making orderliness extremely challenging.

ii. The allocation of insufficient SCRs for training remained a nagging issue even during training for the 2019 General Election. The Training Department of TEI had been in contention with the State offices, especially the ICT Departments, over the number of SCRs to deploy for training. State ICT Departments insisted that the SCRs were being configured for use during elections at the period of training. With limited number of SCRs and the necessity to maintain sufficient redundancy for the election, the Commission had insufficient spare capacity to deploy for training as required by the Training Department.

iii. The delay and eventual non-passage of the Electoral Act amendment Bill into law and the consequential late
iv. Training took place in public buildings, mostly State primary and secondary schools while they were in session. They were mainly available after official closing hours, sometimes late in the afternoon. Without electricity supply, much of the training could not go into the evening thereby making the duration of training a major challenge to the Commission.

completion of work on the Regulations and Guidelines for the election delayed the completion and production of the training manual which impacted on both the availability of the manuals in good time and the efficacy of training.
Chapter 7
Transportation: Movement Of Personnel & Materials
7.0 Preamble

Provision of adequate transportation plays a major role in resolving logistic issues usually hindering easy movement of personnel and materials during elections. In recognition of this, the Commission concentrated its transportation needs for the 2019 General Election on three distinct strategies.

First, delivery of voting materials, both sensitive and non-sensitive, their storage and subsequent distribution to specific locations to facilitate voting on Election Day.

Secondly, development of a standard transportation template for movement of personnel and materials, including clear matrix for the number of vehicles required for forward logistics.

Thirdly, to ensure the return of materials and staff from voting stations, arrangement was put in place for a smooth and full reverse logistics. The APO III was designated to take charge of reverse logistics i.e. receipt of materials after poll through the use of form EC25B now incorporated into the in PU Booklet.

7.1 Main Issues

7.1.1 Engagement with Road Transport Unions: Issues and Challenges

As a result of some logistics challenges experienced during the 2015 General Election, the Commission organised a conference on Electoral Logistics for the 2019 General Election in Lagos on the 28th June 2018. Part of the recommendations were that some relevant stakeholders should be engaged to discuss and work out strategies and modalities for tackling identified challenges in logistics delivery on Election Day with a view to mitigating such challenges in the build-up to the 2019 General Election.

The Objectives of the roundtable were to:

i. Review the MoU with NURTW.

ii. Establish MoU with RTEAN and NARTO.

iii. Develop a workable template and methodology for transportation/logistics delivery for electoral activities.
iv. Assess transportation infrastructure, spatial distribution, operational terrain and types of vehicles for electoral activities.

v. Work out acceptable and efficient payment mechanism to service providers.

7.1.2 The MoU with NURTW

In 2015, the Commission established a formal and robust partnership with NURTW through the signing of an MoU for Election Day transportation based on the following considerations:

i. The NURTW is considered to have more fleet of vehicles at their disposal across the country compared to other transport unions.

ii. The Commission is constrained with respect to timely deployment and retrieval of election materials and personnel, in view of the vast geographical terrain and limited number of vehicles in its fleet.

iii. It is believed that the NURTW, as the main body for road transport workers nationwide has the capacity to deliver election logistics required for Election Day operations throughout the country.

iv. NURTW is equally localised and its members understand the local terrain and road network in the hinterland.

v. Dependence on political actors with vested interest in the deployment of men and materials on Election Day will be practically reduced.

vi. Security and safety in the deployment and retrieval of personnel and materials on Election Day will be virtually centralised for effective and efficient control, monitoring and tracking.

vii. The Commission believes that election administration entails partnership with stakeholders and more especially in the area of election logistics and security. It is on this basis that it considers NURTW as a critical partner in overcoming the perennial transportation challenges during electoral activities.

As a fallout of the retreat in 2018, a number of recommendations were made leading to the decision to:

i. Review the existing MoU with NURTW; and

ii. Establish modalities for further collaboration with other stakeholders such as NARTO and RTEAN to expand the scope of collaboration and encourage healthy competition so that all the Commission’s eggs are not put in one basket.

The MoU between INEC on the one hand and NURTW, RTEAN and NARTO on the other was expected to be implemented down to the State and LG branches of the unions and through them reach the transport owners as well. Representatives of the State branches were equally
involved in the formulation and implementation of the MoU.

7.2 Challenges

In spite of the elaborate arrangements made with the Unions, stakeholders identified the following challenges encountered in the field:

i. The failure of transport owners to deliver on agreement on Election Day to provide adequate vehicles as and when required.

ii. There were some allegations of partisanship demonstrated at various levels (National, State and LGA) by NURTW members involved in Election Day activities.

iii. There were cases of dereliction and abdication of responsibilities, especially for the retrieval of men and materials at the end of poll activities (reverse logistics).

iv. Absence of full enforcement measures down to the LGAs and RAs and inability to sanction defaulters, most especially at the State level.

v. Moving the sheer quantity of materials across the vast and variegated terrain across the country posed a formidable challenge. The national infrastructure to support such a huge logistics was a major hindrance.

vi. All along, the Commission made arrangement with the transport unions on the assurance that they covered both land and maritime sectors. However, the MWUN insisted on a separate but similar arrangement with the land transport unions which the Commission had to accede in order to ensure that personnel and materials reach far flung riverine locations accessible only by sea.

vii. Political interference in the transport industry is a major challenge to electoral logistics and transport management in Nigeria. Some branches of the unions openly expressed partisan views.

viii. Election Day logistics involves officers of security agencies who are required to accompany poll officials to the RAs, PUs and collation centres. Some of the officers arrived late due to the non-provision of logistics and non-compliance of transport owners to stated agreement to convey electoral materials and personnel on Election Day.
The deployment of technology to improve the efficiency and integrity of elections in Nigeria has positively impacted on the conduct of the elections. The major responsibility of any EMB is to conduct free, fair, and credible elections. The introduction of technology to drive electoral process has helped in discharging this responsibility. Deployment of technology for the 2019 General Election was one of the numerous topics discussed at the various retreats. Two issues were reviewed and analysed as follows:

i. Technology deployed before and during 2019 General Election.

ii. Technical support management.

The capability of the SCRs deployed in 2015 for accreditation of voters was enhanced before the 2019 General Election to eliminate the use of incidence forms and strengthen the electoral process. The INEC Technical Support Staff Management System (ITMS) deployed was a laudable initiative. It gave the technical personnel the ability to register and apply as ad hoc staff online. The ITMS was used for the screening and recruitment of technical ad hoc staff for the General Election.

The Commission received several valuable information from the various review meetings. Successes and challenges were highlighted and strategic direction for the Commission’s programmes and activities for the next electoral cycle were proffered.

8.1 Main Issues

8.1.1 Continuous Voter Registration System (CVRS)

The CVR took place at designated locations across the country, usually at the INEC LGA offices in each State. The DDCMs used for Registration of Voters store the information captured from registrants in a local database. At almost all the review meetings, general issues bordering on the technology used to support the CVR were discussed. Generally, the review meetings highlighted the success of the process, although there were reported incidences of poor performance of some of the DDCMs deployed for the exercise. The various meetings also harped on
the need to look into the method of voter data transfer from the DDCM to centralized location to ensure that the loss of voters’ data during data migration and consolidation is drastically reduced if not eliminated. It was also pointed out that there is the need for the Commission to explore the possibility of doing a semi real-time registration and the need to upgrade the registration software.

8.1.2 Voter Accreditation System (VAS)

On Election Day, voters were required to present their PVCs which is read by the SCR. The PVCs have RFID chips which contain the following information:

i. Last Name

ii. First Name

iii. Gender

iv. Registration Date

v. PU Information

vi. Photo

vii. Fingerprint Templates (4)

The voter is then required to scan his/her fingerprint on the SCR. A template is generated from this scan and compared against the fingerprint templates stored on the PVC to confirm he/she is the true owner of the card. This is used to confirm that both Card and Owner of the Card were confirmed, verified and authenticated during the accreditation process.

The SCR was upgraded prior to the 2019 General Election to overcome the challenges identified with voter authentication during the 2015 General Election. The discussions on the SCR were focused on its functionality and effectiveness after the upgrade, challenges encountered and recommendations to improve on successes achieved.

An overall assessment at the review meetings indicated an improvement in the functionality of the SCR after the upgrade. The SCR was also effective in its primary functions of voter authentication. However, there were issues with the VAS as follows:

i. Some instances of malfunctioning of accreditation system on election day due to technical glitches and inefficient accreditation software.

ii. Limited hardware capability. The network handling capability of the SCR is restricted to 2G networks, consequently limiting its capacity in achieving high data transfer rates (slow connections). Furthermore, the device RAM capacity cannot allow use of memory intensive applications.

iii. Inadequate training for the ad hoc staff operating and supporting the SCR.
8.2 Cross-cutting Issues

The cross-cutting issues with ICT in collaboration with EOps and Training Departments are as follows:

i. Recruitment of technical support staff
ii. Training of technical support staff
iii. Deployment of technical support staff
iv. Payment of technical support staff

On recruitment and training, the review meeting commended the Commission on ITMS, a platform deployed to recruit technical support staff for the voter accreditation system. The ITMS was used for the screening and recruitment of technical ad hoc staff for the 2019 General Election. The review meeting commended the laudable initiative as it gave the technical personnel the ability to register and applied as ad hoc staff online. However, the review meeting at various levels pointed out that the shortlisted personnel and a considerable number of suitably qualified applicants were unable to secure appointment as technical support staff because there were multiple online channels of application/recruitment and that the recruitment process commenced rather late which led some State offices to exploit alternative options to recruit the required personnel which in some cases were not suitably qualified.

Another cross-cutting issue was duration of training for the technical support staff. It was highlighted that the period of 3 days for training should be extended to 7 days. It was suggested that the training be done much earlier before the election and it should be intensive and with some evaluation.

The retreats at various levels suggested that there should be consistency in the handling of training allowances for technical support staff nationwide as they observed that variations in the allowances paid in some States.

8.3 Challenges

8.3.1 Continuous Voter Registration System (VRS)

The issues with the VAS highlighted at the review meetings are as follows:

i. Voter registration data loss due to damaged or defective DDCMs, unintentional erasure of backup media in transit and non-adherence backup procedures resulting in empty or corrupt backup files.

ii. Multiple registrations. There were a few cases where some individuals registered more than once and such records still existed in the database in the same or different locations.

8.3.2 Voter Accreditation System (VAS)

The issues with the VAS highlighted at the various review meetings are as follows:

i. Inability of SCR to read the PVCs due
The review meeting commended the laudable initiative as it gave the technical personnel the ability to register and applied as ad hoc staff online.

- Ineffectiveness of the accreditation software to detect a voter who already passed through the system but brings another PVCs other than his/her own.
- Late commencement of SCR configuration.

### 8.3.3 Technical Support Management

The review meetings identified some issues with the management process as follows:

- **i. Non-standardisation of the recruitment process.**
- **ii. Slow response to complaints from the field.**

No doubt the technical support management was faced with challenges. The recruitment process was not standardised. There was a late decision on who should recruit, deploy and pay the ad hoc staff. Also, the appropriate qualification was not clearly stated beyond basic computer literacy leading to disparity in the quality of persons recruited. Consequently, there was inadequate response to the complains by some of the technical support officers who were supposed to have resolved all the challenges within the RAs.

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Chapter 9
Procurement & Deployment Of Election Materials
Procurement of materials for previous General Election was handled by individual Departments and Directorates in the Commission. However, in compliance with the Federal Government on-going reform on Public Procurement, the Commission centralised its procurement process before the 2019 General Election. This resulted in the creation of Procurement Department saddled with the responsibility of driving the Commission’s procurement processes in line with the PPA 2007.

The procurement of materials for the 2019 General Election was the first major and largest procurement ever done by the Commission since the centralisation of its procurement functions. This involved the acquisition of both sensitive and non-sensitive materials and equipment deployed before, during and after the General Election. Over two million tons of ballot papers/result sheets were procured within a very limited timeframe in addition to the procurement of other materials (works goods and services). The 2019 General Election is arguably the biggest and most daunting procurement exercise ever embarked upon by any public institution in Nigeria within a short period of time.

Undoubtedly, coordinating such a massive procurement of materials for a General Election is laced with some challenges, taking into consideration our political milieu and the cumbersome nature of the public procurement process. However, the Commission ensured that the materials were largely procured and delivered in good time.
9.1 Main Issues

The 2019 General Election was conducted with various sensitive and non-sensitive materials. The process used in acquiring the materials was carried out in line with the provisions of PPA 2007 and other extant regulations. The timeframe that was required for compliance with the provisions of the laws demanded early commencement of the process.

The Procurement Department developed a Procurement Plan and Timeline with consideration on the minimum period stipulated in the PPA 2007 for completion of procurement processes. The timeline was developed to guide the Commission in taking decision on the procurement requirements for the elections.

Main issues identified by stakeholders in the procurement of election materials are as follows:

i. The late arrival of some of the sensitive election materials at the various locations where they were to be used resulted in the rescheduling of the election by one week from Saturday 16 February 2019 to Saturday 23 February 2019.

ii. Inadequate logistic capacity to handle the movement of large quantity of materials encumbered the distribution of the materials to, and within, States of the Federation.

iii. There were instances of wrong packaging of ballot papers and result sheets. This resulted in the movement of a few materials to wrong destinations.

iv. There were also some reported instances of low quality or inadequate quantity of some non-sensitive materials.

9.2 Challenges

The following challenges were identified:

i. Late completion of the procurement processes caused mainly by delayed passage of budget and lack of funds. Although the procurement process commenced since 2017, the delay in the passage of the election budget impeded the completion of the process. Contracts could neither be awarded or where they were, funds were not available to mobilise contractors, vendors and suppliers in good time.

ii. Fledgling national infrastructure to handle huge logistics within a short period of time, including ground handling facilities at airports hampered the distribution of some sensitive and non-sensitive materials.

iii. Some court judgments delivered few days before scheduled dates for the elections delayed the production and distribution of some ballot papers and result sheets.

iv. The PPA 2007 is restrictive and cumbersome. There is no provision for special agencies like INEC with
peculiar responsibilities.

v. Limited approval threshold for the Commission.

vi. Inefficient record keeping and inventory of available electoral materials, equipment and other assets at all levels.

vii. Inadequate time for distribution of materials. Timing is an essential factor in the procurement of materials for elections. Required distribution time is not just for delivery of materials to the central stores, time is also needed for inland distribution to the zonal and State stores of the Commission. Available time for distribution of materials for the 2019 General Election was extremely limited. To overcome the challenge, virtually all the materials meant for the zonal and State stores were delivered directly to those locations as part of the contractual agreement.

viii. Lack of adequate storage facilities at the State and LGA offices.

The late arrival of some of the sensitive election materials at the various locations where they were to be used resulted in the rescheduling of the election by one week from Saturday 16th February 2019 to Saturday 23rd February 2019.
10.0 Preamble

Election Day processes are here discussed in the context of activities and tasks that took place on Election Day. The accomplishment of requisite tasks or the processes on Election Day go a long way to define the credibility, transparency and acceptability of elections and electoral outcomes.

The mode of recruitment of ad hoc personnel for the 2019 General Election was via PRES with online and offline submission options. Over 900,000 people applied for various positions ranging from APOs, POs, RAC Managers and SPOs. Aside this, the Commission deployed COs and ROs to the 8,809 RAs, 991 State Constituencies, 774 LGAs, 360 Federal Constituencies, 109 Senatorial districts, 29 States where Governorship elections were conducted and 68 Area Councils in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). One Supervisor each was also deployed to every Senatorial District and each State for the Federal and State elections conducted in 2019.

The need to ensure early commencement of polls resulted in the introduction of the RAC system in 2011. RAC is an identified location for overnight camping of poll officials and electoral materials. A public building central to all the PUs is usually picked to serve as RAC. The activities at the RAC, PUs and all collation centres were monitored by the Electoral EOSC which also served as the call centre for issues and feedback throughout the Election Day activities. Once the
deployment is done, the poll officials are to report at the RACs latest by 4.00 pm on the eve of Election Day to go through all activities slated for RACs. On Election Day, they are deployed as early as 5.30am, depending on the distance to their PUs, to enable them set up and open the PUs for voting by 8.00am.

10.1 Main Issues

10.1.1 RAC Preparation and Activation

RAC preparation involved identification of such public buildings, especially schools, community halls and public television viewing centres located in enclosures with perimeter fencing. The Commission provided some essential facilities to ensure minimum comfort for the poll officials such as water, electricity, toiletries and security. This arguably makes the Commission the only EMB which supplies its own electricity and water for election officials.

Once these facilities are on ground, it becomes the responsibility of RAC managers to make the centre active for the exercise. The creation of RAC as a strategy for achieving early commencement of polls through overnight camping of poll officials has, to a large extent, assisted the Commission to largely overcome perennial lateness of officials to the PUs and late commencement of polls on Election Day.

The Commission provided some essential facilities to ensure minimum comfort for the poll officials such as water, electricity, toiletries and security.

10.1.2 Accreditation, Voting, Sorting, Collation and Declaration

Accreditation is the process of ascertaining the eligibility and qualification of a prospective voter to exercise his/her franchise in a particular PU. It involves verification of voters using the SCR, authentication of the finger prints, crosschecking the voter’s name on the register of voters, ticking the appropriate boxes on the manual register and inking the cuticle of the finger in line with the provision of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended).

Accreditation and voting commenced simultaneously at 8.00am and closed at 2.00pm, provided that any voter already on the queue at 2.00pm shall be allowed to be accredited and vote. The CAVS was adopted and used in the 2019 General Election to prevent the hiccups witnessed
during the 2015 General Election, where voters who accredited in the morning and later asked to come back. This was one of the factors that affected the overall voter turnout in previous elections as many voters failed to show up after accreditation and therefore could not cast their votes.

CAVS was strictly adhered to during the 2019 General Election, and it afforded voters opportunity to stay behind within the prescribed distance to observe the end of voting and the counting of ballots by election officials at the PUs. It is pertinent to state that CAVS improved the quality of election and made the votes count during the 2019 General Election.

Voting was by open secret ballot system where a voter collected his ballot paper in the open, voted for the party of his/her choice secretly in the cubicle without any interference and dropped the ballot marked and folded paper into the ballot box in the open.

Immediately after the close of poll, poll officials sorted out the ballots. This process involved cancellation of the unused ballot papers by crossing them out; sort out the ballot papers by party and thereafter loudly count the votes scored by each political party in the presence of the polling Agents, observers and the media. However, where there is any disagreement and party agent demanded for a recount, this was done but only once as provided by law.

Collation and declaration of election results was the last lap in the Election Day process. It is a process whereby results are tabulated and aggregated. It is a critical, sensitive and important process in an election. The process is critical. Little mistake can lead to a faulty collation and subsequent declaration of the wrong person as winner which may result into crisis.

As soon as the collation of results is concluded, the RO is mandated to record the result using the election result declaration form and formally makes a statement declaring the result and returning the winner of the election.

However, if it is found that the election could not produce any winner due to inconclusiveness of the process or any other related factors as witnessed in the 2019 General Election, it is incumbent on the ROs to decline declaration and
state the reason(s) for his action based on the provisions of the law. Subsequently, Commission shall fix a date for supplementary election to determine the winner of the contest as it happened in Governorship elections in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Kano, Plateau and Sokoto States.

Realising the importance of collation and declaration of results to credible election, the Commission decided to excuse its regular staff from participating in the process. The Commission now relies on senior academic staff from the universities and other tertiary institutions to serve as COs and ROs. This has been the trend since the 2011 General Election. This idea was applauded by the stakeholders because it was seen as innovation that will actually make the votes count.

10.1.3 Deployment to and from RACs to PUs

After the required number of poll officials have been recruited and trained for the election, the next step is their deployment to RACs to PUs. As much as is practicable, poll officials are expected to be deployed to the RAs and PUs located close to their places of residence. This is to enable them to easily locate the RACs and the PUs. This deployment is often done by the EO or by the HOD (Operations) on behalf of the REC.

Once the deployment is done, the poll officials report at the RACs latest by 4.00 pm on the eve of Election Day for them to be able to go through all activities slated for RAC. On Election Day, they are deployed as early as 5.30 am depending on the distance to their PUs to enable voting to commence by 8.00 am.

10.1.4 Conduct of Party Agents and Election Observers

In line with the provisions of the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, a political party sponsoring a candidate may by notice appoint one person as its polling agent for each PU and collation centre. Parties may also nominate a representative at each
distribution point of electoral materials in the Constituency where it is sponsoring candidate(s) for election. The essence of this is to ensure that the process is transparent and free of any manipulation. As observed by the group of COs at the retreat, some of the agents of the major parties performed their duties creditably well and their input aided freeness and credibility of the election.

In a similar vein, the accredited election observers, both local and international, participated in the 2019 General Election. Different groups were seen at the PUs and collation centres. Some also observed the distribution of materials at State, LGA and RAC levels. They observed the process without any interference.

10.1.5 Conduct of ad hoc Staff

The 2019 General Election witnessed the participation of thousands of ad hoc staff, majority from the NYSC and Federal Government institutions.

The success recorded in the election cannot be discussed in isolation of their contribution. Many of them abided by the rules and regulations of the election. They did the job with all the zeal and commitment required, even in the face of harassment and intimidation by the party agents. However, there were also reported cases of violation by some of the ad hoc staff. A few have been investigated and disciplinary action, including judicial prosecution, taken against them.

10.1.6 Conduct of Collation and Returning Officers

CO and ROs were engaged from Federal Universities and other tertiary institutions to undertake collation, return and declaration of winners in the election. The idea of involving them in the conduct of election is to prove to the world that Commission is impartial, neutral and transparent in the discharge of its duties. It is generally believed that senior academics are generally apolitical and many of them lived up to the expectation and delivered as expected.
However, some stakeholders at the review meetings, including INEC officials, observed that some of the COs and ROs exhibited an unhelpful attitude of superiority by refusing to listen to the Commission’s officials assigned to assist them.

10.2 Challenges

10.2.1 RAC Preparation and Activation

The review meeting identified the following challenges:

i. Considering the standard of most of the government-owned facilities in the country, most of the schools serving as RACs are in very dilapidated conditions and need urgent repairs.

ii. In most cases, the heads of schools were chosen as RAC Managers contrary to the Commission’s policy. Heads of Schools are not supposed to be RAC Managers. School teachers, INEC staff and any qualified and responsible members of the community are engaged. As a result of improper recruitment by EOs, some Managers were not always available to activate the RACs at the appropriate time. In some cases, the Managers switched off their phones to avoid being ‘disturbed’.

iii. Some of the EOs, in their effort to cut corners failed to provide necessary facilities that will help to activate the RACs.

iv. The absence of perimeter fence makes some of the RACs vulnerable to infiltration by political thugs.

v. There are also reported cases of location of RACs in hotels, residential and other private properties although the Commission’s policy is to relocate them to public buildings.

vi. Lack of suitable public buildings in many communities negatively affected preparations for the election in particular and public perception of the credibility of the electoral process in general.

vii. Security concerns in some States did not allow for the activation of RACs mainly on the advise of the security agencies.

10.2.2 Deployment to and from RACs to PUs

A major challenge with deployment to RACs and to PUs is inadequate number of qualified personnel caused by the failure of some of the ad hoc staff to show up on Election Day. This often leads to inevitable or sometimes indiscriminate replacement by the SPOs. Another factor militating against ad hoc staff deployment from RAs to PUs was the eleventh hour inter-LGA posting of election officials. The result was late arrival at the RACs and commencement of PU activities on Election Day. Another issue was the late deployment of officials by either the EOs or the HODs (Operations) which in some cases leads to the deployment of untrained personnel as poll officials.
Transportation was another bottleneck in the deployment to and from RACs to PUs. There were cases where vehicles hired to move poll officials to distant RACs and PUs will not be available as and when required for a variety of reasons. This situation undermines the process. Similarly, the late arrival of the security men or even when available the absence of vehicles to convey them also affects early movement to RACs and PUs.

10.2.3 Accreditation, Voting, Sorting, Collation and Declaration

Stakeholders also raised a number of issues relating to the accreditation, voting, sorting, collation and declaration processes as follows:

i. The failure of the ad hoc staff to adhere to accreditation and voting procedures (e.g. dating stamps and dating the back of ballot papers as well as ticking the manual register).

ii. Inadequate security at the PU level as most of the ballot snatching reported during the 2019 General Election happened in the course of sorting of votes in PUs.

iii. The alleged partisan inclination of some of the COs was also raised by stakeholders although no hard evidence has been adduced in support of this assertion. In addition, issues of inadequate training or lack of proper knowledge of the electoral process, the collation and computation of results, lack of cooperation with collation support Staff and lack of familiarity with Excel Spread Sheet have been raised, just as cases of alleged inducement of COs and ROs by desperate politicians.

iv. The proliferation of political parties also slowed down the collation and declaration of results in the 2019 General Election.

v. The secrecy of ballot was compromised in some places due to the monetisation of the process by politicians. Vote buying became pronounced in some of the off-season elections and this continued into the 2019 General Election where voters were seen casting their votes for the highest bidder.

10.2.4 Conduct and Behaviour of Party Agents and Election Observers

Some of the unsavoury incidences that occurred in the 2019 General Election were triggered by the unruly behaviour of some of the polling agents. As observed by many stakeholders, some party agents were responsible for vote buying at PUs, harassment and intimidation of opposition members and even poll officials. It is unfortunate that all these happened with the collaboration or non-chalance of some security personnel. The COs and stakeholders also observed that some of the local observer groups were politicians in disguise. They exhibited their partisanship through support for candidates of one political party or the other.
Chapter 11
Reverse Logistics: Retrieval of Field Assets
11.0 Preamble

Reverse logistics is the process of retrieving field assets from their point of use to the Commission’s stores. Field assets to the Commission are those inventories that were issued to election officials for the purpose of conducting election at the various PUs. Therefore, reverse logistics is the retrieval of field assets for the purpose of audit, re-use or proper disposal.

Election materials were deployed to 176,996 locations (119,973 PUs and 57,023 VPs) nationwide on Election Day. As soon as electoral activities were concluded across the 36 States and FCT, materials that were deployed to different locations were retrieved to the points of collection i.e. the Commission’s Headquarters, State and LGA offices. Accordingly, the review meeting focused on the following aspects of reverse logistics:

i. Transportation arrangements.

ii. Electoral materials audit.

iii. Storage of sensitive electoral materials.

11.1 Main Issues

11.1.1 Transportation Arrangement

The transportation arrangement put in place by the Commission was expected to cover the deployment and retrieval of personnel and materials to and from the various locations throughout the country. As soon as the polls closed, reverse logistics commenced. Both sensitive and non-sensitive electoral materials were retrieved from the PUs to LGA offices using the transportation arrangement for the election. However, some sensitive materials such as SCRs, used and unused ballot papers and result sheets were moved from the field to LGA offices and ultimately to the State stores for proper custody and issuance of CTC of documents in the event of litigation.

11.1.2 Electoral Materials Audit

As the sensitive and non-sensitive materials are returned to their various sources as stated above, there is always the need to audit them.

The issuer of electoral materials at every source is expected to receive the retrieved materials and check their correctness using the Form EC 25B (Electoral Materials Reverse Logistics Form). Such check is to establish the quantities and genuineness of each item contained in the EC25 B for use in future elections. It is expected the status of retrieved electoral materials is established before their eventual storage.

Several challenges were identified. These include:

i. Some APOs III responsible for the retrieval of electoral materials may not be readily available to account for them, particularly in places where elections were disrupted by violence.

ii. Political thugs may snatch retrieved electoral materials as they are being
returned for storage and, therefore, such materials could not be fully accounted for.

iii. The issuer may be overwhelmed to establish the quantities and conditions of retrieved electoral materials but later only to discover the quantities and condition as recorded in EC 25B are incorrect.

iv. Some hired transporters may abandon ad hoc staff and materials at the PUs thereby compelling such ad hoc staff to leave before sunset without completing the reverse logistics.

v. Some of the vehicles used for forward logistics may be attacked and destroyed by thugs and therefore unavailable for reverse logistics. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to make alternative arrangement because transporters will be reluctant to commit their vehicles to volatile places. In this case, the few official vehicles of the Commission and/or private vehicles of supervisors and monitors are used.

11.1.3 Storage of Sensitive Materials

Retrieved sensitive materials are items of value because they attract huge capital outlay and when they are not properly stored could lead to deterioration and waste. However, most retrieved sensitive materials are not properly stored because of inadequate facilities in the Commission’s offices nationwide.

11.2 Challenges

Some of the observable hitches preventing proper storage of sensitive materials across LGA and State stores nationwide include:

i. Inadequate and poor conditions of storage facilities. Despite the disposal of obsolete materials in the Commission’s stores nationwide prior to the 2019 General Election, inadequate storage space is still a major challenge in the Commission.

ii. Most of the retrieved sensitive materials are mixed up with non-sensitive in the small spaces available in the State stores, making retrieval often difficult.

iii. Other sensitive materials that could not be stored are kept in the open without protection from the harsh weather conditions.

Some State offices lack proper documentation of reverse logistics as the Stores Directorate at the Commission’s Headquarters has no oversight functions over State stores as is the case with other Departments such as Finance and Account, Audit, ICT and Legal Departments.
Chapter 12
Security Challenges and Recommendations Before, During and After 2019 General Election
12.0 Preamble

Conducting a secure and violence-free election is a major challenge confronting many EMBs in developing countries, including Nigeria. Elections represent a very important aspect of the socio-political system and development of a democratic country and as such broader security challenges confronting a developing country are heightened during elections. This is particularly so because of the contending social forces that create security problems resulting in violence.

In recent times, security has been a major challenge facing the conduct of elections in Nigeria. It is important to note that the environment of our elections has a great impact on election security. Deployment of security personnel to 119,973 PUs and the 57,023 VPs has remained a challenge that stretches the capacity of Nigerian Police and other security agencies to their limits.

However, the issue of insecurity in elections has been a recurrent decimal in Nigeria, the most recent being the 2011 post-election violence in some States of the Federation leading to the death of many citizens, including ad hoc staff engaged by INEC for the election. The violence experienced after the 2011 General Election generated great concerns to the Commission and to contain the challenge, an electoral security framework was designed before the 2015 General Election. With the success of the security framework, the Commission adopted the same approach during the 2019 General Election. The framework includes ICCES, ERM, EVMAT and BaSED.

12.1 Main Issues

The review meetings on election security reflected on some specific thematic issues and made recommendations. These are:

12.1.1 Relations between INEC and Security Agencies

The formation of ICCES has provided a veritable framework for high level discussions on election security. At
the national level, the relationship is cordial and ICCES leverages on its regular meetings to address many security issues confronting the electoral process. To a large extent, the planning and implementation component of the Commission’s election security framework has worked but a lot more needs to be done.

Generally, the work of ICCES at State and LGAs levels is not as strong as is the case at the national level. While ICCES is more active at State level, this arrangement barely exists in many LGAs except when there is an election. The implication is that there are no regular meetings of the Committee in many States, resulting in weak planning, coordination and implementation of security plans.

### 12.1.2 Effectiveness and Impact of Electoral Risk Assessment

The ICCES Committee applauded the introduction of electoral risk assessment by the Commission and made the following recommendations for sustaining the programme:

i. The need to have one document guiding all the agencies, it could be called a National Risk Management Document.

ii. The risk assessment tool was a useful document but should be simplified into bullet points for ease of use and reference during elections.

iii. The Commission should sustain its risk assessment through regular meetings and evaluation of performance at each outing.

iv. The need to involve the military in lifting of election materials when the need arises.

v. To take over and undertake conclusive investigation of all electoral offences recorded during the elections.

vi. Act as liaison between the Nigeria police and INEC in the processing of case files and prosecution of electoral offenders as well as ensuring that police investigators and other vital witnesses attend court sessions during trials.

vii. Liaise with the Legal Department of INEC as well as Federal DPP in the Ministry of Justice towards reviewing and perfecting the case files and drafting appropriate charges against electoral offenders preparatory to their arraignment, noting that some electoral offences have implications within the context of other criminal laws.

viii. Keep record of electoral offences and offenders to support future strategic plans and development of a data base.

ix. Establish trends and patterns of electoral offences based on the analysis of cases recorded and investigated as well as convictions secured.

x. Liaise with all State Police Commands for the purpose of talking over and undertaking detailed investigation.
12.1.3 Deployment of Security Personnel

Deployment of security personnel during the 2019 General Election was commended by a wide spectrum of participants at the review meetings. This was premised on the presence of security personnel in almost all the PUs and Collation Centres across the Federation. The challenge was their strategic deployment. Recounting their experience, some stakeholders at the review meeting observed that State offices of the Commission were flooded with security personnel overstretches available facilities for their stay and convenience but thinly deployed in some critical locations where voting and collation of results took place.

12.1.4 Conduct and Behaviour of Security Personnel

The perception of partisanship of some security personnel has remained a recurring decimal in the conduct of elections. This is because the professional conduct of security personnel is crucial to electoral service delivery. It is against this background stakeholders during the review meeting commented on their conduct during the election.

The process was smooth in some States, but not so in others. Some of the RECs complained of bitter experiences in the hands of the security officials posted to their States. There were cases of high level of over zealousness on the part...
of some security personnel leading to serious altercations between them and INEC officials.

12.2 Challenges

i. The review meeting identified the following challenges:

i. Level of violence at some Collation Centres was high and appeared to have overstretched the security personnel.

ii. Incessant redeployment of critical officers on the eve of elections such as Commissioners of Police (CPs) and Divisional Police Officers (DPOs).

iii. Refusal of security personnel posted to PUs to sign their names in the INEC PU Booklet.

iv. Security consciousness was not adequately emphasised during the training of election officials. Most of the officials were not knowledgeable enough to respond properly in life-threatening situations.

v. Security officials were thinly deployed to PUs in remote areas. This has led to many PUs in such locations being used by politicians with sinister intentions.

vi. In some States, security personnel distanced themselves from the PUs on Election Day and never gave the needed security cover to men and materials deployed for the election.

vii. Inconclusive investigation and lack of prosecution of electoral offenders promote impunity and lawlessness. Most of the security personnel were even unaware of what constitutes offence or security breach on Election Day.

viii. Lack of security coverage in some areas due to risk factors such as difficult terrain, insurgency and other criminal activities.

ix. Security personnel were often stranded after elections as no adequate provisions was made for their transportation.

The perception of partisanship of some security personnel has remained a recurring decimal in the conduct of elections. This is because the professional conduct of security personnel is crucial to electoral service delivery.
Chapter 13
Election Monitoring and Support Centre
13.0 Preamble

EMSC is a set of tools that provide coordination for activities that support election planning and implementation. It is basically a planning, monitoring and implementation support tool that allows an EMB to move from a “reactive mode” or “crisis mode” to a “proactive mode” in the implementation of an election project. It involves the monitoring of key election events and tracking of critical election activities, functions and processes as well as KPIs and timelines that consolidate and report results on election plans in order to maintain audit trails. It is also a readiness and monitoring tool designed to track all the processes of pre and post-election activities captured in the harmonised checklist of 362 activities that cut across green, amber and red zone activities.

Prior to the introduction of the EMSC as a system to coordinate all other election monitoring tools, there was the EMS, ERM and EOSC. Due to difficulties experienced during the 2015 General Election in accessing and harmonising information, the Commission decided to merge the three tools to become EMSC under the 2019 EPP.

The EMSC, therefore, came into existence as a result of a major recommendation in the EPP which lists in detail the activities, responsibilities, timelines and cost estimates for the implementation of the diverse and complex processes for the 2019 General Election through the integration of the other monitoring tools.

The EMSC was fully deployed for the 2019 General Election. With the benefit of experience from the 2015 General Election, the EMSC was further developed to accommodate more areas for Monitoring. Two (2) activities were added to the initial Seven Principal Business Areas (7PBAs) bringing the total number to 9PBAs as follows:

i. Election Day Support (EDS)
ii. Election Day Logistics (EDL)
iii. Election Staff Management (ESM)
iv. Election Day Training (EDT)
v. Political Parties and Candidate Management (PPCM)
vi. Election Day Procurement (EDP)
vii. Continuous Voter Registration (CVR)
viii. Voter Education and Enlightenment (VEE)
ix. Conflict and Dispute Management (CDM)

With the above 9PBAs, the EMSC tool was used to monitor activities during elections. For instance, due to inconsistent reports from the States on the level of preparedness for 2019 General Election, the EMSC was deployed for prompt rescue. It is important to note that the shortfalls in the supply of materials were reported on the EMSC platform and National Commissioners were deployed
to States for verification.

The EMSC was instrumental in:

i. Providing a 360° view of the entire election process and facilitated a better monitoring, tracking, implementation, evaluation, coordination and deployment of activities and resources. It created broad capabilities in the implementation and monitoring of timelines and provided real time visibility of field operations for the 2019 General Election.

ii. Enabling the Commission to harness experiences from staff for continuity and institutional memory through the field asset reports.

iii. Tracking logistics challenges using the materials receipt checklist at the State at least two weeks to the 2019 General Election. These challenges were escalated to the appropriate quarters at the Headquarters of the Commission in Abuja for appropriate action.

13.1 Main Issues

13.1.1 Adequacy of Operational Framework

The adequacy of the operational framework posed a challenge during 2019 General Election because EMSC operation was weak in some States.

13.1.2 Operation of State Secretariats and Linkages with HQ EMSC Secretariat

The operation of State Secretariats and linkages with HQ EMSC Secretariat was also weak as a result of the non-collaboration within the State Secretariat e.g. EMS and EOSC were working in isolation.

13.1.3 Functionality and Utility of the EMSC Dashboard

The EMSC Dashboard functioned very well but its use by the States was low. Most of the desk officers at State level were in the field engaged in other assignments. As a result, they could not promptly upload the needed information in real time.

13.1.4 Integration of EMS, ERM and EOSC Platforms

The Implementation of the EMS, ERM and EOSC integration in the State could not be achieved due to lack of collaboration which resulted in late submission of reports from almost 50% of the 36 States and FCT.

13.2 Challenges

The identified challenges were harvested from the meeting/retreat conducted by the Commission. EMSC revealed the level of preparation for 2019 General Election was negatively affected by the delay and subsequent non-passage into law of the Electoral Act amendment bill as well as the late release of funds. Nevertheless, the Commission in its effort to deliver
on its mandate continued with its scheduled activities but not without other challenges as follows:

i. Internet connectivity was a major challenge in some of the LGAs. As a result of the poor network, some monitors, RATECHs etc. could not communicate with the EMSC Desk Officers at the State offices.

ii. There was no instrument to check authenticity of reports. Findings and information from the field ahead of 2019 General Election could not be confirmed to the extent that some of the items supposedly received were not actually fully delivered at the time of reporting.

iii. The EMSC was challenged with time constraint as the implementation of its work plan did not commence early enough. This was largely due to late availability of resources both from INEC and supporting donor agencies for the execution of the EMSC work plan for the 2019 General Election. This lateness also led to non-implementation of some scheduled activities.

iv. The level of ownership differed across the States as it was strong in some States and weak in others. This was evident in the level of compliance to the report validation process and submission of reports in line with the EMSC timelines.

v. Ineffective compliance with the reporting procedure and lack of synergy among the various tools within the established protocol at the State-level due to the conflict in the recruitment of DOs and the State EOSC team. The EOSC specifically had issues with some of the State EMSC DOs appointed by the RECs and were not effectively co-opted into its operation during the election.

vi. The harmonisation of the three electoral support systems was critical in the implementation framework, but the budgeting and funding for some aspects of the operational activities were not properly streamlined. This led to the haphazard payment of the DOs against the Commission’s approved plan.

vii. There was a lack of synergy between EMSC and the Departments and Units within the Commission and inadequate knowledge of the operational goals of the EMSC.

viii. Poor reporting system, especially the quality and timeframe within which reports were made available by the States to the HQ EMSC Secretariat.
This affected the accuracy of the EMSC in tracking election readiness and early identification of threats and risks within the election timelines. This may be attributed to inadequate understanding of the EMSC indicators and operational goals; attitudinal disposition of the task owners, managers and supervisors to the EMSC; and EMSC DOs were assigned to several other electoral activities which led to lack of concentration.
Chapter 14
Impact of Legal Framework
14.0 Preamble

This Chapter reports on the Impact of the legal framework for elections as one of the thematic areas discussed at the 2019 General Election review meetings/retreats. It covers the following sub-themes:

i. Effectiveness of existing framework.

ii. Impact of non-passage of the Electoral Act Amendment Bill into law.

iii. Pre-election matters and election petitions.

iv. Adequacy of guidelines and manuals for the General Election.

v. Diaspora voting.

vi. Early voting.

The legal framework for elections comprises the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), election regulations and guidelines, manuals for election officials and case law. The legal framework guides the policy decision of the Commission in carrying out its mandate such as registration and maintenance of voters’ register, registration and monitoring of political parties, procedure at election and all other activities incidental to the electoral process.

Between 2017 and 2018, the Commission proposed amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act in order to strengthen the electoral process, cure the lacuna in the electoral laws and incorporate recent developments with a view to giving legal backing to some of the new innovations such as the use of SCR, e-collation and e-transmission of results etc.

A total number of 25 amendments to the Constitution were proposed by the Commission but only two (2) were approved in the Fourth Alteration to the Constitution viz:

i. Power of the Commission to deregister political parties; and

ii. Provisions of timelines for hearing and determination of pre-election matters.

In the same vein, the Commission proposed thirty-four (34) amendments to the Electoral Act, out of which only eleven (11) were considered by the National Assembly in the Electoral Amendment Bill 2018, although assent was withheld by the executive barely two months to the General Election. The proposed amendments to the Electoral Act, which were intended to improve the legal framework in time for the 2019 General Election, are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>AMENDMENT</th>
<th>JUSTIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Provisions for replacement of voter’s card.</td>
<td>To reflect the development in the process. There is no duplicate of Permanent Voter Card (PVC). There can only be replacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Increase of the period for Notice of Election from 90 to 150 days.</td>
<td>To allow early primaries, submission, compilation of list of candidates and to give enough time for planning and printing of sensitive materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Display of ballot box to</td>
<td>To reflect the new procedure for simultaneous accreditation and voting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Issuance of ballot papers.</td>
<td>To provide for the use of Card Reader or any other technology prescribed by the Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Electronic voting or any other method as may be determined by the Commission from time to time.</td>
<td>To provide for Electronic voting system. This will increase transparency and build the confidence of the electorate in the electoral process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Number of accredited voters to determine over voting.</td>
<td>The use of registered voters to determine over voting most times lead to inconclusive elections. The total number of accredited voters in a polling unit should determine over voting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Transmission of results from P.U.</td>
<td>To provide for E-Transmission of Election Results at Polling Units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>78(4)</td>
<td>Increase of period of registration of Political party from 30 to 60 days and increase of fine for false information.</td>
<td>To give the Commission reasonable time to carry out all administrative procedure for registration of Political Associations as Political Parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Increase of campaign period from 90 to 150 days.</td>
<td>This is in line with the amendment proposed for the increase of the time for the issuance of notice of election from 90 days to 150 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>100(6)</td>
<td>Increase of fine for media houses and its principal officers.</td>
<td>To provide sanction against principal officers of the media house involved in the crime. Provision should therefore be made to sanction principal officers and other officers of the media house involved in the crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>Conduct of primary elections where a candidate dies before a declaration is made.</td>
<td>To give Political Parties the opportunity to nominate a fresh candidate where a nominated candidate dies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the conclusion of the 2019 General Election, it has become even more imperative to represent the proposed amendments that were not considered and new areas that will require amendments to further strengthen the electoral legal framework. The reports garnered from the 2019 General Election review process with officials of the Commission and stakeholders highlighted a number of challenges in the existing legal framework and the need to urgently address them.

### 14.1 Main Issues

#### 14.1.1 The Effectiveness of the Existing Legal Framework

After the 2015 General Election, the Commission reviewed the legal framework and proposed areas requiring urgent amendments to further strengthen the law and address challenges identified in the electoral process for the delivery of free, fair and credible elections. The idea was to strengthen the electoral process, bridge the lacuna in the electoral law and incorporate recent developments in the electoral process with a view to giving legal backing to some of the new innovations such as the use of SCR as well as the electronic collation and transmission of election results.

However, for the reason mentioned earlier, the Commission conducted the 2019 General Election using the existing legal framework with all its identified challenges. The post-election review has identified critical areas in the legal framework which participants at the various review meetings and retreats opined that if addressed will fill the legal lacuna and increase the credibility of the electoral process.

It is imperative to note that despite the non-passage of the 2018 Electoral Act Amendment Bill into law, the Commission was able to take advantage of the flexibility of the extant provisions. Where the law provides “not later than”, the Commission used it to advantage in fixing the period for notice of elections, the submission of Forms CF001 & CF002 and substitution of withdrawn/deceased candidates. This, to a large extent, contributed to the success of the nomination process.

#### 14.1.2 Impact of Non-Passage to the Proposed Amendments

The two major constitutional amendments passed in the Fourth Alteration relate to the power of the Commission to deregister political parties that did not meet the statutory requirements for continuous existence. More relevant to the 2019 General Election was the timeframe of two weeks (14 days) for filing of pre-election cases. The passage into law of these amendments came too close to the major statutory activities of political parties i.e. the nomination of candidates. Many litigants, including political parties, were unaware of the alteration and ended up filing their actions outside the statutory period. As for the Electoral Act amendment, the SCR remain unsupported by law and there was no legal backing for electronic collation and transmission of results. The
tedious manual processes persisted.

14.1.3 Nomination Process

A major activity that would have benefited from the assent to the proposed amendment was the nomination process. The nomination process for the 2019 General Election (including the FCT Area Council elections) commenced on 10 October 2018 at the ICC, Abuja. It was a hectic process with 90 out of 91 political parties fielding candidates for the elections. In all, a total number of 24,353 candidates were sponsored by political parties for 1,558 elective offices. This covered 68 Area Council constituencies in FCT, 991 State Constituencies, 360 Federal Constituencies, 109 Senatorial Districts, 29 Governorship elections and one nationwide Presidential constituency.

The exercise was an improvement over the previous process as several innovations were introduced in the nomination process. These include the following:

i. Review of Forms CF001 and CF002 prior to the commencement of the process.

ii. Adoption of semi-automated system for the capturing and storage of data of candidates.

iii. The list of political parties participating in each category of election was compiled timeously for the printing of ballot paper.

iv. All candidates validly nominated by political parties were captured on the list of candidates and published within the stipulated timelines.

v. The semi-automated system adopted allows easy access to candidate's data from a centralized and organized reporting system. The system assisted in the prompt compilation of list of candidates.

vi. The process also supports electronic archiving, easy retrieval and security of candidates' data.

14.1.4 Pre-Election Matters and Election Petitions

Election dispute adjudication is an integral part of the electoral process because there will always be challenges in the conduct and outcome of the process. The Constitution and Electoral Act provide for the filing of pre-and post-election litigations, grounds for questioning the result of an election, the mode of challenging an election, the time within which to file a pre-election matter and election petition to challenge the return of a candidate. The laws also provide for the Tribunal or Court with jurisdiction to hear and determine election petitions, the time limit within which to hear and deliver their judgments etc. INEC is a statutory respondent in all election litigations.

14.1.5 Electoral Dispute Adjudication

Electoral dispute adjudication is one of the functions of the Nigerian judiciary being the arm of government vested with the judicial powers to interpret and apply the
law. The judiciary adjudicates electoral disputes (pre- and post-elections) at various stages of the process. In recent times, the role played by the judiciary in the electoral process has no doubt given rise to positive and crucial transformation in the democratic development of Nigeria.

14.1.6 Election Disputes and Jurisdiction of Courts

Pre-Election

Sections 31(5) and 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) provide in clear terms that the Federal High Court, High Court of a State or FCT have jurisdiction to hear and determine pre-election disputes. Similarly, Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act provides for the legal remedy open to an aggrieved aspirant in party primaries thus: “Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or Rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.”

However, in view of the Nigeria’s electoral history, the power of courts to stop the holding of primaries or General Election or the processes thereof is ousted by the provision of Section 87(10) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). The intendment of this provision is to ensure that primaries and elections are not unwittingly disrupted due to litigations.

Post-Election

Section 137 of the Electoral Act (as amended) allows candidates and political parties that participated in an election who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the election to challenge it through filing of election petitions at the Tribunal or Court (in case of Presidential election).

Section 133(1) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) also provides thus: “No election and return under this Act shall be questioned in any manner other than by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (in this Act referred to as an “Election Petition”) presented to the competent tribunal or court in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act, and in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party”.

In respect of post-election disputes, only Election Tribunals or Court of Appeal, established under Sections 285(1) & (2) and 391(1) of the CFRN are vested with original jurisdictions to entertain post-election disputes.

14.1.7 Appeals

The Court of Appeal is vested with appellate jurisdiction in pre-election disputes. However, its decisions are liable to further appeals to the Supreme Court.

As regards election petitions, the Court of Appeal is vested with original jurisdiction to hear Presidential election petition as the court of first instance. It also has appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals
against the decisions of election petition tribunals. However, as an appellate court, its decisions in respect of appeals from the decisions of the Election Tribunals arising from the National and States House of Assembly election petitions are final. The right to further appeal against the decisions of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of Governorship and Presidential elections are unaffected by dint of Section 233(2) (e) of the Constitution. The President of the Court of Appeal constitutes the Election Tribunals.

14.1.8 Time for Determination of Pre-Election Matters and Election Petitions

Section 285 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) provides timelines for hearing and determination of pre and post-election disputes.

Pre-election disputes shall be filed within 14 days of the accrual of the cause of action and must be determined within 180 days from the date of filing. Appeal in pre – election matters shall be filed within 14 days from the date of delivery of the judgment and shall be heard and determined within 60 days from date of filing of the Notice of Appeal. The Supreme Court is the final court in pre-election matters.

Election petitions shall be filed within 21 days after the date of the declaration of results of the election and an election Tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition. Appeal arising thereof shall be determined within 60 days from the date of delivery of the judgment.

14.1.9 Electoral Offences

Under the Electoral Act, offences committed at pre-election, election and post-election stages constitute electoral offences. These include offences committed during registration of voters (Section 24), finances of a political party (Section 88), impersonation by applicant for ballot paper (Section 59), ballot box snatching, the buying and selling of voters’ cards (Section 24) and mutilation of election results etc.

Several other offences are listed in various Sections of the Act, particularly in Part VIII. Others are listed in Sections 23, 24, 88, 95, 96, 101 and Sections 117 – 132 of the Electoral Act. The commission of electoral offences has become a major threat to Nigeria’s electoral experience. Pursuant to its functions under the police Act, the Nigeria Police arrested and investigated a number of electoral offenders during the 2019 General Election. Although a few cases have been forwarded to the Commission for prosecution, the total number of those arrested has not been determined as the Police is still in the process of compiling the case files while the Commission awaits the outcome in order to commence prosecution.

14.1.10 Adequacy of Guidelines and Manuals

The guidelines and manuals for elections were developed and produced at the last minute after the proposed amendments were not passed into law. The manual
is currently based on the requirements of the provisions of the existing legal framework, which does not cover the new technological innovations in the electoral process.

14.1.11 Timely Release of Funds

The delay in the release of funds to the Commission further hampered the early production and distribution of these documents for effective training of election personnel.

14.1.12 Diaspora Voting

Nigerians living outside the country have consistently agitated for the right to vote in a general election. This right was reaffirmed by stakeholders at the review meeting. However, for that to happen, the electoral legal framework has to be amended to provide for the registration of Nigerians permanently resident abroad as voters and other sundry issues. The Commission assured stakeholders that it is convinced that Nigerians in the diaspora should have the right to vote in elections and has already examined the issues involved and engaged with the 8th National Assembly for the amendments to the electoral legal framework. The required amendments are enumerated in this chapter under challenges.

14.1.13 Early/Special Voting

A large number of personnel engaged on Election Day outside their places of residence/registration have always been deprived of the right to exercise their franchise. There has been a recurring call for the Commission to provide for these categories of persons a platform to exercise their franchise. These categories of persons include the security personnel, poll officials, COs and ROs, supervisors, monitors, domestic election observers, the media and those providing essential services such as medical personnel. Considering how competitive elections have become and the narrow margin of lead in some cases, the number involved may make a difference to the outcome of some elections.

The current legal framework does not make provisions for these categories of persons to exercise their franchise despite having been registered and issued their PVCs. There is therefore the need to propose amendments to the current legal framework with a view to enabling these categories of persons vote at elections.

14.2 Challenges

From the interactions with officials of the Commission and stakeholders at the various review meetings, the following challenges were identified:

i. The large number of political parties led to an avalanche of pre-election and post-election litigations.

ii. Large ballot papers and result sheets due to the number of candidates made their management difficult and occasioned errors during entry and computation of election result figures.
iii. The failure of political parties to adhere to election regulations and guidelines issued by the Commission was identified as a major challenge.

iv. Lack of internal democracy in many political parties leading to a large number of pre-election litigations. Some 809 cases were filed by aggrieved aspirants after the conduct of party primaries.

v. Improper documentation and failure to provide adequate details by candidates and political parties made the compilation and publication of the list of candidates extremely tedious. It also places extra burden on staff of the Commission which made the process of compiling names of candidates and constituencies susceptible to errors.

vi. The absolute powers of the ROs under Section 68 of the Electoral Act remains a challenge to the Commission, especially in instances where declaration of winners was made in error or under duress.

vii. The power to arrest and investigate electoral offenders is vested in the Nigeria Police. While the Commission is empowered to prosecute electoral offenders using its legal officers or any legal practitioner engaged by it, it is clearly constrained in discharging this huge and complex responsibility. Long after the conclusion of the 2019 General Election, only a few case files have been received by the Commission from the Police for prosecution.

viii. Incessant transfer of IPOs who are vital witnesses in the prosecution of electoral offenders affects diligent prosecution which leads to several adjournments that end up frustrating their prosecution.

ix. Inadequate funding of investigation by the Police leads to slapdash investigations and unsuccessful prosecution.

x. The delay in investigation and transmission of case files to the Commission for further action by the Police has hindered the successful prosecution of electoral offenders and touched on the several recommendations made by Constitutional Review Committees which need to be revisited urgently.

xi. The powers of the Attorney General of the Federation and those of the States to enter nolle prosequi have hindered the effective prosecution of high-profile electoral offenders.

xii. The lack of a legal framework on security involvement on Election Day has led to excesses in the conduct of some security personnel during elections.

xiii. Non-compliance with the Commission's guidelines for submission of nomination forms by political parties.

xiv. Failure of some political parties to use the revised Forms CF001 and CF002 put extra burden on the staff.
in ensuring that the candidates are properly placed to avoid cases of unlawful exclusion.

xv. Non-adherence to timelines led to several attempts by some political parties to submit names of candidates after the deadline for filing of nominations. This was consistently declined by the Commission resulting in litigations by aggrieved but non-compliant parties.

xvi. Attempt by political parties to substitute where there was no initial nomination contrary to the provisions of the law. This has led to wrong claims and wasteful litigations by political parties.

xvii. Invalid nomination of candidates. Some parties nominated more than one candidate for the same constituency contrary to the provision of the law.

xviii. The Commission was inundated with several conflicting decisions before and after the 2015 General Election. Most of these decisions were in respect of pre-election disputes. However, the trend of conflicting decisions has tremendously reduced in the pre-2019 election disputes. This was not unconnected with the robust engagement of the Commission with the Judiciary.

xix. There is a large number of Nigerians living in the diaspora who have always complained of disenfranchisement as a result of the inadequacy of the current legal framework.

xx. The impunity in political party administration has contributed to the surge in pre-election and election petitions.

xxi. Multiplicity of instituted matters is another factor that allows litigations to linger on at different courts and different stages. Many never come to full determination.

xxii. Amendment of the following sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to provide for diaspora voting:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Provisions of the Electoral Act/Constitution</th>
<th>Committee Recommendation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Qualification for Registration 12(1). A person shall be qualified to be registered as a voter if such a person – (c) is ordinarily resident, works in, originates from the Local Government/Area Council or Ward covered by the registration centre.</td>
<td>Existing provision should be maintained.</td>
<td>Voters abroad should be registered on the basis of their Ward, Local Government Area and State of Origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26(1)</td>
<td>Postponement of Election 26(1) Where a date has been appointed for holding an election...</td>
<td>Section 26 (1) of the Electoral Act and Section 76 (1) of the Constitution should be amended to read dates instead of date. 26(1) where dates has been appointed for holding an election...</td>
<td>S.76 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to be amended and suggests for dates instead of date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76(1)</td>
<td>Time of election to the National Assembly 76(1) Elections to each House of the National Assembly shall be held on a date to be appointed by the Independent National Electoral Commission in accordance with the Electoral Act</td>
<td>76(1) Election to elective offices shall be held on dates to be appointed by the Independent National Electoral Commission.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sections</td>
<td>Provisions of the Electoral Act/Constitution</td>
<td>Committee Recommendation</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30(1)</td>
<td>Notice of Election</td>
<td>Section 30(1) and section 30(2) should be amended to include INEC website</td>
<td>The section amended to include INEC website to accommodate required Notice to Nigeria citizens in diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30(2)</td>
<td>30(1). The Commission shall … publish a notice in Each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. 30(2). The notice shall be published in each constituency in respect of which election is to be held.</td>
<td>30(1). The Commission shall publish notice of election on INEC website and in each State of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory 30(2). The notice shall be published on INEC website and in each constituency in respect of which election is to be held.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Establishment of polling units</td>
<td>Maintain existing provision.</td>
<td>This provision has been taken care of by S.134 of the Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Commission shall establish sufficient number of polling units in each registration area and shall allot voters to such polling units.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44(2)</td>
<td>Polling Agents</td>
<td>Section 44 of the Principal Act should be amended to include a new sub (3). (3). Provided that nothing in sub section (1) &amp; (2) shall prohibit the format of the ballot papers for Out of Country Voting.</td>
<td>Ballot papers for Out of Country Voting be designed distinctively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ballot papers shall be bound in booklets and numbered serially with differentiating colours for each office being contested.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Hours of Poll</td>
<td>Section 47 of the Principal Act should be amended to include a new proviso at the end, to provide thus: 47. … provided that Out of Country Voting in any particular election shall take place on the date and time as may be appointed by the Commission.</td>
<td>This section should be amended to accommodate variation in time zones across the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voting in any particular election under this Act shall take place on the same day and time throughout the Federation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 15

Conclusion
This Report is the outcome of the post-election reviews organised by the Commission after the 2019 General Election. As with the reviews following the 2011 and 2015 General election, it constitutes one of the significant institutional mechanisms devised by the Commission to examine its planning processes, and election project implementation tools so as to learn lessons for subsequent electoral cycles. Initiated in 2011, such process reviews are key in the identification of strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of the Commission’s election plans and devising solutions to identified challenges. It is these reviews, together with the accompanying reports, that constitute the basis for planning such as the Commission’s SP, EPP and the EMS driven by the EMSC.

From the twelve meetings and engagements the Commission had with its staff and critical stakeholders across the electoral and political processes, this Report chronicles the observations, strengths, challenges as well as recommendations proffered in the planning, conduct and management of the 2019 General Election. Such inputs are critical to the planning and conduct of future elections in particular and for the management of the electoral process in general.

While the engagements were free-flowing and all stakeholders were encouraged to freely contribute to these meetings, the Commission generated a broad framework to guide the discussions. This framework reflected about a dozen issues traversing the entire spectrum of planning, implementation and monitoring of the 2019 General Election.

This report covers all the critical aspects of the electoral process and how current practices may be improved upon. The contributions of EOs and their Assistants, as well as that of Directors of the Commission have enriched this report. Also, REC's brought the wealth of experience from their supervisory roles in the field to bear on the report.

Engagements with political party leaders, heads of security agencies, service providers, as well as other relevant election stakeholders provided us with external opinions regarding the Commission’s policies and implementation processes.

Overall, many important recommendations were made touching on almost a dozen thematic areas. These recommendations will be reviewed by the Commission, from which a programmatic set of activities that will address the challenges identified and lay the foundations for subsequent actions would be taken. These recommendations will be reviewed by the Commission so that it can identify the policies and actions necessary for it to successfully carry out its mandate of free, fair, credible and peaceful elections in Nigeria.
Chapter 16
Recommendations
16.0 Preamble

Each of the preceding chapters of this report ended by enumerating the challenges encountered in the preparation and actual conduct of the 2019 General Election. This chapter brings together the recommendations from the review meetings organised thematically as follows:

16.1 General State of Preparedness

The reviews were unanimous in identifying the central role of logistics in the conduct and management of free, fair and credible elections. At the heart of the matter is how to improve the procurement, delivery, deployment and retrieval of electoral materials and personnel in order to ensure that most, if not all, PUs open at 8am on Election Day; collation and transmission of results take place seamlessly; and personnel and materials are promptly retrieved after an election. Arising from the review of the 2019 General Election, these recommendations focused on measures that can, in the future, ensure a better logistics management of electoral processes. The following are the key recommendations:

i. Delivery of all non-sensitive election materials to State and FCT Offices 30 days to any election so as ensure proper audit and quality assurance;

ii. Provision of adequate storage facilities for the LGA offices without prototype buildings;

iii. Creation of one additional zonal store per geo-political zone to ease the current logistics challenges in the storage and distribution of electoral and related materials;
iv. Confirm availability of ballot boxes (with black, red and green lids) in adequate quantities in State/FCT/LGA Offices four (4) weeks before General election;

v. Re-use and/or recycling of unexpired/undamaged electoral materials such as stamp pads etc. for subsequent elections.

vi. Replacement of paper envelopes with tamper proof envelopes in all elections to ensure the integrity of sensitive election materials;

vii. Minimise over customisation and ensure proper carbonisation of result sheets so that carbon copies have legible imprints from the originals;

viii. An end to the use of inappropriate facilities such as metal containers for the storage of sensitive electoral materials like the DDCM and SCRs.

ix. Early renovation of Commission offices and stores prior to election as well as the appointment of Store Officers and provision of shelves and racks in all LGA Offices;

x. Commencement of the building of prototype offices in LGAs without them, and provide perimeter fencing where lacking;

xi. Embark on the verification of new settlements and the identification of RA boundaries across the country for the purposes of the creation of additional PUs;

xii. Relocate inappropriately located PUs. As a matter of policy, all PUs should be public buildings accessible to all citizens and not private properties;

xiii. Proper identification of PUs with PU Stickers/Posters or some other landmarks and the production of PU Guide Maps for easy location by voters, poll officials and other stakeholders;

xiv. Geo-referencing of all PUs and RAs;

xv. Review of RACs/Collation Centres nationwide in conformity with laid down criteria;

xvi. Sourcing of RAC managers from the Staff of the Commission;

xvii. Adequate consultation with stakeholders in undertaking the delimitation of the boundaries of Constituencies and the creation of additional State Constituencies;

xviii. Review of signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with relevant MDAs to build a good working relationship and information sharing for proper Constituency delimitation;

xix. Provision of necessary data and continuous training to improve the skills of GIS staff at the Headquarters and State offices;

xx. Engagement with State governments on the renovation and rehabilitation of public buildings/institution used as PUs, RACs and Collation Centres;
xxi. Engagement with ICCES members on better security arrangement for RACs and Collation centres.

### 16.2 Voter Registration and PCV Collection

The registration of voters is one of the key responsibilities of the Commission. By law, the Commission is required to conduct voter registration continuously, but until 2017, such exercises were undertaken periodically, usually just before elections. The roll out by the Commission of the CVR in April 2017 afforded citizens who attained the age of 18 years since the last voter registration in 2011 or who were hitherto unable to register to do so and obtain their PVCs in order to vote in elections. In addition to these two categories, those who have either lost their PVCs or otherwise damaged or defaced are provided the opportunity to obtain new cards, or those that want to transfer their registration to do so. The conduct of the CVR exercise was suspended just before the 2019 General Election. To address the numerous challenges encountered, the following recommendations were made:

i. The CVR exercise and PVC collection by registered voters should be sustained and resumed immediately at the LGA level only;

ii. The Commission should consider acquiring new technology and data capture systems for CVR exercise;

iii. Improvement of the voter registration process to accommodate online registration;

iv. Upgrade of the current data capture software and AFIS software to clean up the register and guard against multiple registration;

v. Effective and sustained supervision of the CVR and PVC collection processes by management staff of the Commission at State and LGA levels to check abuse;

vi. Clean-up of the voter registration database and converting it into a searchable, interactive format;

vii. Timely purchase and distribution of voter registration materials and release of funds to State and FCT offices to check delays, shortages and ensure quality control.

viii. Decentralisation of the procurement of some consumables for CVR exercise and for the printing of voters’ register to the State offices.

ix. The Commission should print cards on a monthly basis instead of the current quarterly basis so as to encourage people to pick their PVCs during the pendency of the registration exercise.

x. Embark on on-the-spot printing and replacement of PVCs that are 10 years old or more;

xi. PVCs released to States should be accompanied by the list and phone numbers of registered voters to facilitate easy collection;
xii. Every LGA RAO should be IT compliant and with capacity to effectively undertake the CVR and PVC collection exercise;

xiii. Inclusion of the number of registered voters on the customised Form EC8 series to address the issue of discrepancies in figures along the various levels of collations;

xiv. Undertake quality control on data sent for printing of PVC to reduce, if not eliminate the incidence of multiple printing and other errors.

xv. Collect data on PWDs by type of disability at registration stage to enable proper provision of assistive facilities on Election Day.

16.3 Voter Education, Publicity and External Relations

Voter education and publicity remain a consistent challenge for the Commission. This is demonstrated in complaints from stakeholders that the Commission’s voter education outreach is insufficient to mobilise voters and comes too close to elections to have a meaningful impact on the voter. A consistently raised point in support of this position is the declining voter turnout figures and increasing incidence of spoiled ballots across the country.

In addition to voter education and publicity, other issues are: the process of accrediting journalists for election; availability of observer kits to journalists; their access to collation centres and safety during elections. While these issues are significant and addressing them would immensely improve the electoral process, doing so would also require a huge financial outlay. While it is the responsibility of the Commission to do basic voter education, mobilising voters is an activity that should be taken seriously by political parties as well as other stakeholders of which CSOs and the media are doing a lot. The following were the key recommendations:

i. Voter education and publicity should be an all-round activity across the electoral cycle, to be intensified when elections approach.

ii. The Commission should enhance its collaboration with key stakeholders such NOA, media organisations, CSOs, and similar bodies in the development and dissemination of voter education messages.

iii. Resuscitation of the NICVEP to drive a comprehensive, implementable voter education and publicity programme with timelines and deliverables derived from the Commission’s Strategic Plan;

iv. Improvement in accrediting journalists for elections, including timing, kitting, online accreditation and biometric registration;

v. Protection and support for accredited journalists in the discharge of their assigned duties during elections;
vi. Accessibility to all collation centres to all stakeholders to promote transparency;

vii. Demilitarisation of elections to enhance voter turnout;

viii. Institutionalisation of priority voting for all vulnerable persons (the elderly, pregnant women and lactating mothers etc.);

ix. Provision of assistive voting for citizens that require them on Election Day;

x. Constant upgrade of, and up to date content for, the Commission’s website;

xi. Opening of a twitter account by the Hon. Chairman for direct communication with the public;

xii. Collaboration with relevant regulatory agencies and professional bodies to combat fake news and hate speech.

16.4 Political Parties and Election Observation

INEC has the mandate to register and monitor political parties. The Commission holds regular quarterly meetings with political parties to inform them of its activities and programmes and to receive feedbacks. In the course of the review, issues bordering on deepening internal party democracy, the management of the parties, engagement with election observers etc. were discussed. The following were the key recommendations:

i. Facilitation of more training and capacity-building for party officials on party administration and management;

ii. Amendment of the Electoral Act to address gaps in the provisions for campaign financing to strengthen mechanisms for campaign finance monitoring and compliance;

iii. Immediate publication of the Report on 2019 General Election Campaign Finance Monitoring;

iv. Enforcement of Section 225A of the Fourth Alteration to the 1999 Constitution relating to the “status of registered political parties”;

v. Effective measures to enforce all existing provisions of the law on party primaries;

vi. Engagement with IPAC, party leaders and relevant stakeholders to promote inclusivity and popular participation especially for women, youth and people with disabilities;

vii. Strengthen the collaboration with political parties and relevant stakeholders on the enforcement of regulations on party and campaign financing;

viii. Propose amendment of Section 45 of the Electoral Act to provide sanctions for non-compliance with the submission of agents lists by political parties;
ix. Propose amendment of the Electoral Act to give the Commission more powers to address the issue of compliance and enforcement of internal democracy in political parties;

x. Seek amendment to the Constitution to strengthen the provisions on regulation of party registration and introduction of strict requirements for access to the ballot;

xi. Leaders of Political parties requested for an amendment to the 1999 Constitution providing for annual and election grants to political parties;

xii. Revision of requirements for the accreditation of observers to include vetting of observer groups and persons by the Department of State Security;

xiii. Delivery of election observer kits to State and FCT Offices at least a month to an election;

xiv. Political parties to ensure affirmative action of at least 35% representation for women, youth and PWDs in their nomination of candidates for elective offices;

xv. The electoral legal framework should be amended to allow for proportional representation in elections to the National and State Houses of Assembly as the current winner-takes-all system favours the big parties and stifles the growth of plural democracy. This will also stem the tide of violence associated with elections;

xvi. The Nigerian Constitution should be amended to provide for stronger legislation against defection by elected members of the National and State Houses of Assembly from one party to another. Such defectors should automatically lose their seats except in the case of merger of two or more parties;

xvii. The funding of political parties from budgetary allocation should be restored. However, this should not be tied to election campaigns but for the purpose of maintaining infrastructural facilities and membership registration.

xviii. Collaboration with development partners and accredited observer groups on training and capacity development for election observation;

xix. Propose amendment to the Constitution to transfer the conduct of LGA elections from the State Electoral Commissions to INEC;

xx. Unbundling of the Commission by creating a separate Political Parties Registration Commission to relieve INEC of some of its extensive responsibilities.
16.5 Electoral Personnel: Recruitment, Training, Deployment & Remuneration

With regards to the recruitment, training, deployment and remuneration of election personnel, the following were the key recommendations:

i. Increased synergy and coordination between INEC Headquarters, INEC State and FCT Offices and relevant authorities from the various agencies on recruitment, training, deployment and remuneration of election personnel;

ii. Upward review of the remuneration of ad hoc staff, especially the remuneration of SPOs;

iii. Recruitment of volunteers as election personnel to reduce the cost of payment to ad hoc staff;

iv. Reconsider the involvement of permanent staff in Election Day activities as POs, SPOs and COs. The use of Commission staff may reduce compromise, enforce discipline, improve quality of service and most importantly make punishment of erring officers easier;

v. Recruitment of supplementary ad hoc officials from MDAs and professional associations such as NBA, NUJ etc. based on proper guidelines to State and FCT offices on the terms and conditions;

vi. Organisation of training for election officials should be undertaken during weekends and school holidays for ease of securing access to the training centres;

vii. Timely approval and release of Regulations and Guidelines for the Election by the Commission and delivery of adequate training manuals to State and FCT Offices;

viii. Timely and adequate Training of Trainers and cascade training of ad hoc staff;

ix. Only of trained and certified ad hoc staff should be engaged for election duties;

x. Development of a standard and comprehensive manual by TEI in collaboration with EOps, P&M and LS Departments for the training of COs and ROs as well as root trainees to address all issues relating to the collation of results;

xi. Enforcement of punitive action against erring INEC staff on illegal replacement of ad hoc staff;

xii. Issuance of letters of appointment with specified terms and conditions to all categories of ad hoc staff engaged by the Commission for election duty;

xiii. Development and dissemination of a comprehensive online training, certification and re-training programmes for the use of prospective election workers to complement
the usual three (3) days face-to-face training;

xiv. Provision of adequate demonstration SCR (dummy SCR) for training purposes;

xv. Conclusion of all levels of training at least 14 days before an election to enable State and FCT Offices conclude necessary paperwork on the engagement and deployment of recruited ad hoc staff;

xvi. Placement of advertisement for online recruitment of ad hoc election staff at least 6 months before a General Election;

xvii. Provision of adequate funds for training at the LGA level (e.g. logistics, tables, chairs, assessment forms etc.);

xviii. Institutionalisation of root and refresher training programmes to enhance electoral processes and procedures;

xix. There should be complementarity in the training organized by HRM for general skills and electoral training for all EOs and AEOs;

xx. Elevation of the Training Unit of TEI to a full Department at the State and FCT Offices for effective electoral service delivery;

xxi. Improvement of transportation for, and prompt payment of allowances to, all categories of ad hoc staff to avoid complications on Election Day;

xxii. Adequate welfare arrangements should be made for INEC regular and ad hoc staff during collation of results to avoid inducement by politicians.

16.6 Transportation: Movement of Personnel and Materials

i. Review of INEC-NURTW/NARTO Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for effective implementation at State and LGA level with provision for sanctions against erring service providers;

ii. Consideration for difficult terrains in negotiation with transport providers;

iii. Contingency provision for back-up vehicles in case of breakdown;

iv. Inspection of vehicles before deployment. The collaboration between INEC and the FRSC in this regard should be sustained;

v. Drivers should be properly educated about their roles during election;

vi. Provision of at least one operational vehicle for each LGA office of the Commission;

16.7 ICT, SCR, DDCM, CVR and Internet Services

The growing use of technology in the planning, conduct and management of elections became a feature in our elections with the introduction of MRI
in the voter registration process in 2006. Since then, INEC has increasingly deployed technology to address some of the key challenges in the management of electoral processes.

However, the deployment of technology in the electoral process is not without its challenges and the review identified a number of issues with the following key recommendations:

i. Design, development and deployment of a compact, more versatile system and integrated equipment with improved connectivity that can perform current functions of the DDCMs and SCRs for voter enrolment (registration) and accreditation (verification and authentication);

ii. Explore the possibility of real time registration, whereby, voter data after registration on the DDCM is automatically transmitted to a temporary storage at the backend, pending approval by an Administrator before such registration is consolidated into the national database in order to resolve most issues relating to multiple registrations, data loss and other unforeseen circumstances;

iii. Introduction of mandatory Post-Training Certification Process for Registration Officers and ad hoc staff to ensure their suitability and capacity for the use of ICT equipment for election;

iv. Carry out voter fingerprint forensic analysis to identify poor quality Fingerprint for recapture and update;

v. Devise a mechanism to revalidate all registered voters and integrating their fingerprint data into the national voter registration database to eliminate the concept of “Partial Accreditations”;

vi. Upgrade the fingerprint identification software to allow the assignment of voters’ fingerprint templates and data to a specific PU in order to compare the live and captured fingerprint scan during accreditation;

vii. Conduct of Data Network analysis at all PUs nationwide for proper deployment of SIM cards for efficient connectivity;

viii. Inclusion of PU-specific AFIS in the accreditation software to prevent multiple voting;

ix. Provision of Hardware and Software infrastructure at least 30 days before an Election to eliminate the late commencement of SCR configuration;

x. Harmonization of ICT/Electoral Operations recruitment portals to a single portal; and

xi. Increase the number of days for training all electoral staff on the use of electoral technology to promote effectiveness and efficiency.
16.8 Procurement and Deployment of Election Materials

Elections are time-bound and the timely procurement and delivery of sensitive and non-sensitive election materials in adequate quantity is central to the successful conduct of any election. The review identified a number of issues with the following key recommendations:

i. A comprehensive review of the functions and responsibilities of the Procurement Department with the view of improving its efficiency and capacity to deliver;

ii. Early commencement of procurement processes and timely release of adequate funds to the Commission for the procurement of required goods, works and services;

iii. Explore possibility of phased budgetary appropriation and funding of General Election in the Commission’s annual budget. To this end, General Election budgets should be spread across at least 3 budgetary cycles;

iv. Early commencement of procurement processes for capital projects like construction and renovation of INEC offices and acquisition of non-perishable materials and technology;

v. Enforcement of quality control and value-for-money measures for procured goods, works and services;

vi. Engagement with relevant authorities to understand the Commission’s peculiarities with regard to electoral activities that are time-bound;

vii. Rehabilitation/Construction of storage facilities in all LGA offices;

viii. Early and effective engagement with relevant national institutions and mobilisation of relevant national assets for the production, receipt and deployment of sensitive election materials;

ix. Increased/enhanced approval threshold for the Commission to facilitate timely processing and procurement of election materials;

x. Development of a purpose-built Inventory Management System in order to keep track of procured materials and other valuable assets across the board to enhance accountability, proper auditing and effective planning;

xi. The Commission should consider approving training for Directing staff and Procurement Officers on procurement processes and related matters; and

xii. Major policy changes on the Electoral process with direct impact on procurement should be made and concluded not later than twenty-four (24) months to General Election.
16.9 Election Day Processes

The review identified a number of issues on Election Day Processes and made the following key recommendations:

i. Staff of the Commission should be given opportunity to serve as SPOs and RAC Managers in future elections with improved honoraria;

ii. Enforcement of the existing timeline for resumption of SPOs to avoid late arrival at the RACs;

iii. Deployment of COs before 8:00am on Election Day to facilitate proper briefing and working relationship with other officials;

iv. Improved working relationship between COs and EOs and between COs and CSRVS officers and RA Supervisors during training and work in the field to reduce friction and cases of wrong entries or mutilation of results;

v. Continued piloting and ultimate use of electronic collation/transmission of results for future elections;

vi. Provision of enhanced welfare for all electoral officials to avoid inducement by politicians;

vii. Deployment of magnifying glasses, Braille and other types of assistive facilities to PUs as required;

viii. Test-running and ultimate adoption of e-voting; and

ix. Adoption of early/special voting for election duty and other related officials.

16.10 Reverse Logistics: Retrieval of Field Assets

The review identified a number of issues relating to reverse logistics and retrieval of field assets including personnel and materials and made the following recommendations:

i. Review of the INEC/NYSC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to address the nonchalant attitudes of some Corps members engaged for election duties in handling reverse logistics;

ii. Provision of adequate security personnel for election duty to protect lives, properties and electoral materials;

iii. Deployment of ICT gadgets for tracking of movement of election personnel and materials;

iv. Effective use of Form EC25B to take stock of election materials for proper accountability of inventory during reverse logistics;

v. Review of the MoU between INEC and with transporters with a view to making it mandatory for drivers to stay with ad hoc staff at PUs and to ensure effective reverse logistics;

vi. Provision of adequate storage facilities
and necessary protective measures nationwide to ensure that reusable election materials are properly kept; and

vii. Bringing Zonal Stores nationwide under of the Stores Directorate and the deployment of professionals to manage the INEC Stores nationwide.

16.11 Security Challenges Before, During and After the 2019 General Election

The review identified a number of issues and challenges on election security and made the following recommendations:

i. The Security agencies should deploy adequate number of security personnel to protect election officials and materials at Voter Registration Centres, PUs, RACs, Collation Centres and INEC offices nationwide;

ii. Engagement with ICCES members for the provision of adequate security and logistics support during elections taking into consideration the peculiarity of each State and LGA.

iii. Design and development of a National Security Plan on elections to identify and determine logistic or manpower requirements for election security;

iv. Deployment of rapid response team to identified flashpoints prior to elections, taking into cognizance the Commission’s ERM report and similar reports from the security agencies;

v. Incorporation of crowd management techniques, recognition of IEDs, dealing with suspicious persons etc. in the training of Security personnel on election duty; and

vi. Establishment of a Special Election Monitoring Team (SEMT) by the Police with the specific mandate of monitoring and responding to all election-related threats in a proactive manner.

16.12 Election Monitoring and Support Centre

EMSC, incorporating the EMS, ERM and EOSC, provided a comprehensive platform for the management and monitoring of the 2019 General Election. Following the evaluation of the activities and operations of the EMSC in the course of elections, the review process made the following recommendations:

i. A definitive Commission policy on the operational structure and framework of the EMSC enforcing proper harmonization and integration of all the components of EMS, ERM and EOSC into the EMSC;

ii. Development of a comprehensive EMSC Work plan for the training, management, support and implementation of current and revised SP, SPA and 2023 EPP as well as other Commission processes before December 2019;

iii. Early commencement of training and
retraining of Staff at the State and LGA levels on utilisation of the EMSC platform;

iv. Early activation of the EMSC platform for tracking and monitoring of Election plans and implementation of electoral activities;

v. Early commencement of training and retraining of INEC staff both at the HQ, State/FCT and LGA levels on the EMSC operational structure, processes, guidelines and procedures in order to deepen the understanding of the staff on EMSC and to create a good communication and flow of information within the Commission’s Departments/Directorates and EMSC;

vi. Enforcement of compliance with the EMSC reporting cycles and timelines to facilitate timely availability of data for accurate assessment of election readiness and early identification of threats/risks;

vii. Review of EMSC integrated structure to identify fault lines and promote improved and harmonised operations;

viii. Early identification and training of EMSC Desk Officers and their exclusion from participating in other election duties on Election Day.

16.13 Impact of Legal Framework

From the review meetings, the following recommendations were made:

i. Early presentation of proposed amendments to the electoral legal framework, which should be concluded at least 12 months to the next General Election to provide for effective planning and logistics;

ii. Take appropriate steps to exercise powers under Section 285A of the Fourth Alteration to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Section 78 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) regarding the registration status of political parties that are in breach of the statutory provisions;

iii. Collaborate with other stakeholders to advocate for amendments proposed by the Commission regarding requirements for the registration of political parties, access to ballot by registered political parties, period for publication of personal particulars of candidates etc.;

iv. Advocate for the creation of Electoral Offences Commission and Tribunal with powers to arrest, investigate and prosecute electoral offenders;

v. Engage with political parties to promote adherence to all regulations and guidelines governing the nomination of candidates for elections;

vi. Training of officials of political parties to enhance their knowledge of the nomination process;

vii. Automation of the nomination process
to facilitate the storage, access and retrieval of candidates’ data;

viii. Engagement with the Judiciary, the Body of Benchers, the NBA on the electoral processes and procedures;

ix. Development of training modules on the electoral legal framework for Commission’s staff and the electoral officials;

x. Review all MoUs to incorporate an assessment template to evaluate the performance and compliance of service providers to agreed terms and conditions; and

xi. Review mode and terms of payments to vehicle providers for election duty with enforcement mechanism for defaulters.

16.14 General Issues

i. The Commission should liaise with stakeholders as early as possible to kick start the necessary legal and administrative reforms;

ii. The Commission should consider either extending the number of training days of improving its quality;

iii. The Commission should revisit all relevant MoUs and ensure that they are tailored towards achieving its core mandate of conducting credible elections;

iv. The existing MoUs with limited service providers should be expanded to include other relevant organisations, particularly in the area of transportation;

v. The Commission should also create a template for proper assessment of the performance of service providers to ensure compliance;

vi. There is need to ensure harmony among service providers such as NARTO, NURTW, RTEAN and MWUN;

vii. The mode of payment to transport providers should also be reviewed. Payment should be made in two instalments e.g. 50% upfront and 50% on completion of assignment with stiff penalties for non-performance;

viii. The Commission should consider sourcing some of its ad hoc personnel from its pool of retired staff;

ix. INEC needs to review the criteria for recruiting ROs and COs;

x. The commission’s communication policy needs to be recirculated to the staff of the commission for them to be abreast of its contain and requirements;

xi. In order to ensure effective communication flow within the Commission, its Communication policy must be strictly adhered to;

xii. The succession plan for staff of the Commission should be reviewed in view of retirements of experienced staff;
xiii. There must be thorough assessment of Commission’s facilities before a general election and, where necessary, the deployment of new infrastructures and machinery must be ensured in order to achieve success;

xiv. The Commission should construct specially air conditioned stores to preserve and enhance the functionality of all store items, especially SCRs and other sensitive and non-sensitive materials that could still be reused in another election;

xv. All LGAs should be provided with prototype storage facilities in addition to State Stores in order to cope with the quantum of election materials received in the State and LGA offices. Such “Gadgets” as SCRs should not be used for more than two (2) election cycles;

xvi. The zonal stores arrangements should be streamlined to enable State offices collect election materials from more proximate Zonal Stores;

xvii.Procured heavy equipment like generators and voting cubicles should be delivered directly to the State offices by contractor instead of the Central of Zonal stores; and

xviii. Pre-election budget allocation should be transferred on time to the States.